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Introduction
This thesis is about two kinds of (closely related) logics: Modal logics
and justiﬁcation logics, both based on intuitionistic propositional logic.
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, and epistemic logics are logics
dealing with knowledge. A classical way to formally treat knowledge goes
back to Hintikka [Hin62]. In this approach, modal logic is used as an
epistemic logic, with “the agent i knows that” as the modality ✷i and a
possible worlds semantics. Justiﬁcation logics are a more recent addition
to the logical landscape. In these logics, we can explicitly reason about an
agents’ evidence/justiﬁcations. Justiﬁcation is a central epistemic concept
as well, and justiﬁcation logics are closely related to modal logics.
Accordingly, this thesis has two parts. The ﬁrst part is about intu-
itionistic modal logics, the second about intuitionistic justiﬁcation logics.
In the ﬁrst chapter, we recall some soundness and completeness results
about intuitionistic modal logic and ﬁx notation and terminology. The
logics IK and IT introduced here will serve as base logics that will later
be extended by additional machinery, and the logic IS4 will show up again
in the justiﬁcation logic part. The next two chapters are about extending
these base logics with distributed knowledge D and common knowledge C,
respectively. For both these extensions, completeness will be shown using
some canonical model constructions. In the case of distributed knowledge,
we need to make a detour via so-called pseudo-models and strict pseudo-
models. For common knowledge, we will have to work in a ﬁnite fragment
and construct canonical models tailored to speciﬁc formulas.
Finally, we turn to intuitionistic justiﬁcation logic. Using similar tech-
niques as in the previous chapters, we show soundness and completeness
for so-called basic modular models and modular models.
1

Part I.
Intuitionistic Modal Logic
3

Intuitionistic modal logic combines modal logic with intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic. For combining intuitionistic propositional logic with modal
logic, there are several design choices to be made, and accordingly, there
exist various approaches.
As two examples, Artemov and Protopopescu in [AP14] reject the
axiom ✷A → A, but instead argue for an axiom A → ✷A, and Hirai
[Hir10] uses a version with ✷i(A ∨ B) → ✷iA ∨ ✷iB. Other approaches
are, for example, Williamson [Wil92] and Proietti [Pro12].
Our formalism starts oﬀ from a framework for intuitionistic modal
logic presented in Fischer Servi [Fis84] and Plotkin and Stirling [PS86] and
discussed from a broader perspective in Simpson [Sim94]. We extend its
✷-fragment to several agents. In the following chapters, we will extend our
language with operators D for distributed knowledge and C for common
knowledge.
5

1. Intuitionistic versions of K, T
and S4
In this ﬁrst chapter, we brieﬂy discuss some systems of intuitionistic modal
logic, mention some results from the literature and ﬁx our notation. We
will introduce the language LK which can express statement about the
knowledge of multiple agents, along with a proof system and a semantics.
This logic will be extended to treat distributed knowledge and common
knowledge in the following chapters.
In naming our logical systems, we follow the tradition in modal logics
to keep the historical names of logics, like S4, and add an “I” for “intuition-
istic”. We will consider the intuitionistic variants of the classical systems
K, T and S4 and call them IK, IT and IS4. In this thesis, I will only
treat modal logics with ✷-modalities.
1.1. The language LK and its semantics
Definition 1.1 (The language LK ). Given a ﬁxed but arbitrary natural
number ℓ ≥ 1, the language LK comprises the following primitive symbols:
(PS.1) Countably many atomic propositions p, q, r (possibly with subscripts);
the collection of all atomic propositions is called Prop.
(PS.2) The logical constant ⊥ and the logical connectives ∨, ∧, and →.
(PS.3) The modal operators ✷1, . . . ,✷ℓ.
Definition 1.2 (Formulas). The formulas of LK are inductively deﬁned
by:
(a) every atomic proposition is a formula;
(b) the constant symbol ⊥ is a formula;
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(c) If A and B are formulas, then (A ∧ B), (A ∨ B) and (A → B) are
formulas;
(d) if A is a formula, then ✷iA is a formula (for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ).
As is common in intuitionistic logic, we deﬁne negation ¬A by (A→ ⊥)
and equivalence (A ↔ B) by ((A → B) ∧ (B → A)). We often omit
parentheses if there is no danger of confusion.
Given a set of formulas M we set
✷iM := {✷iA | A ∈M} and ✷
−1
i M := {A | ✷iA ∈M}
and for a ﬁnite set of formulas M = {A1, . . . , An} we set
∧
M :=
n∧
i=1
Ai and
∨
M :=
n∨
i=1
Ai
Lemma 1.3.
M ⊆ N =⇒ ✷iM ⊆ ✷iN and ✷
−1
i M ⊆ ✷
−1
i N.
Definition 1.4. An epistemic Kripke structure (EK-structure for short)
of order ℓ is an (ℓ+3)-tuple M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) with the following
properties:
(EK.1) W is a nonempty set (the set of the so-called worlds, states or points
of M) and ≤ is a preorder on W.
(EK.2) Ri ⊆ W ×W for i = 1, . . . , ℓ is a binary relation on W , called an
accessibility relation, such that for any w, v ∈W,
w ≤ v =⇒ Ri[v] ⊆ Ri[w].
(EK.3) V : W → P(Prop) is a function, called an evaluation, such that for
any w, v ∈W,
w ≤ v =⇒ V (w) ⊆ V (v).
M is called a reflexive EK-structure iﬀ all relations R1, . . . , Rℓ are reﬂexive,
and called a transitive EK-structure iﬀ all relations R1, . . . , Rℓ are transi-
tive. We will also speak of agent i for the i-th agent in the group. We call
8
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an EK-structure a single-agent structure if ℓ = 1. In this case, we simply
write ✷ instead of ✷1. Also, we often just call an EK-structure of order ℓ
an EK-structure if its order is not relevant or clear from the context.
Following standard notation in modal logic, we will write wRiv for
(w, v) ∈ Ri and set
Ri[w] := {v ∈W | wRiv}.
The accessibility relations Ri represent an agents’ epistemic state: we can
read wRiv as : “at state w, the agent considers the state v to be a possible
state of aﬀairs, a possible scenario”. Accordingly, Ri[w] is the set of states
accessible to the agent i, the set of world this agent considers possible from
his viewpoint of the world w.
An agent’s knowledge is then represented as follows: The agent knows
A iﬀ A is true in all worlds that he considers possible. Typically, knowledge
is assumed to imply truth: We can not know things that are wrong (we can
only falsely believe them). One may argue that for this reason, the logics
K and IK are not really logics of knowledge, but (at best) of belief. Being
aware of this, in this thesis we are more concerned with speciﬁc technical
questions, so we put aside such considerations and always talk of knowledge
and not of belief.
The condition (EK.2) ensures monotonicity for formulas of the form
✷iA. Whenever agent i progresses along ≤, the collection of worlds that
are accessible for i can go down, reﬂecting the fact that some worlds are
ruled out as being accessible due to new information. If Ri is reﬂexive then
all worlds v such that w ≤ v are accessible for agent i from w.
Definition 1.5 (Satisfaction). We deﬁne the satisfaction (or truth) of a
formula A at a point w in an EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ),
written as (M, w)  A, inductively as follows:
• (M, w) 2 ⊥;
• (M, w)  p iﬀ p ∈ V (w);
• (M, w)  A ∧B iﬀ (M, w)  A and (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A ∨B iﬀ (M, w)  A or (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A→ B iﬀ (M, v)  B for all v ≥ w with (M, v)  A;
9
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• (M, w)  ✷iA iﬀ (M, v)  A for all v ∈ Ri[w] for i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
If the EK-structure is clear form the context, we will write w  A for
(M, w)  A. Given an EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ), we write
M  A if (M, w)  A for all w ∈ W , and given a an arbitrary but ﬁxed
number ℓ, we write  A for M  A for all EK-structures M of order ℓ. We
write ref and ref ,tr for validity with respect to the classes of reﬂexive and
reﬂexive as well as transitive EK-structures.
Definition 1.6 (Denotation). We deﬁne the denotation of a formula A in
an EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) as the set of worlds where it
holds true:
‖A‖M := {w ∈W | (M, w)  A}
This notion will be useful in the part about common knowledge, where
we consider operators on sets of worlds. We will often write ‖A‖ instead
of ‖A‖M if the model is clear from the context.
The following lemma summarizes some easy observations about the
denotation of complex formulas.
Lemma 1.7 (Monotonicity). For each EK-structureM = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V )
we have
(M, w)  A, w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  A.
Proof. We proceed by induction on A.
• A = ⊥ or A ∈ Prop. Then the claim follows immediately.
• A = B ∧ C or A = B ∨ C. Then the claim follows immediately from
the induction hypothesis.
• A = B → C. Let u ≥ v such that u  B. Since ≤ is transitive, we
have that u ≥ w, so it follows from the assumption w  B → C that
u  C. Since u was arbitrary, it follows that v  B → C.
• A = ✷iB. Since w  ✷iB, we have that u  B for each u ∈ Ri[w].
Since w ≤ v, we have Ri[v] ⊆ Ri[w], so u  B for each u ∈ Ri[w],
which means that u  ✷iB.
Lemma 1.8 (Facts about denotation). For each EK-structure M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) and all LK -formulas A,B and C we have
10
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(a) ‖A ∧B‖M = ‖A‖M ∩ ‖B‖M
(b) ‖A ∨B‖M = ‖A‖M ∪ ‖B‖M
(c) ‖A→ B‖M = {w ∈W | {v ∈W | w ≤ v} ∩ ‖A‖M ⊆ ‖B‖M}
(d) ‖✷iA‖M = {w ∈W | Ri[w] ⊆ ‖A‖M}
(e) ‖A ∧B‖M ⊆ ‖C‖M ⇐⇒ ‖A‖M ⊆ ‖B → C‖M
(f) W = ‖B → C‖M ⇐⇒ ‖B‖M ⊆ ‖C‖M
Proof. The ﬁrst four assertions follow immediately by the deﬁnitions. We
proceed by showing the ﬁfth assertion. For the direction from left to right,
assume that ‖A ∧ B‖M ⊆ ‖C‖M, and let w ∈ ‖A‖M, so w  A, and let
v ≥ w with v  B. By monotonicity, it follows that v  A, so v  A ∧ B,
i.e. v ∈ ‖A ∧ B‖M. By our assumption, v ∈ ‖C‖M, i.e. v  C. It follows
that w  B → C ,i.e. w ∈ ‖B → C‖M. For the direction from right to left,
assume that ‖A‖M ⊆ ‖B → C‖M, and let w ∈ ‖A ∧B‖M, i.e. w  A ∧B,
so w  A, so by our assumption w  B → C. Since we also have w  B, it
follows that w  C, i.e. w ∈ ‖C‖M.
To show the sixth assertion, let A be a tautology. Then, using the previous
result, we have
‖B‖M = ‖A ∧B‖M ⊆ ‖C‖M
(e)
⇐⇒
W = ‖A‖M ⊆ ‖B → C‖M ⇐⇒
W = ‖B → C‖M
Remark 1.9 (Metavariables). We will A,B,C,D for arbitrary formulas,
M,N for sets of formulas and w, v, u for worlds, sometimes with subscripts.
1.2. The Hilbert systems IK, IT and IS4
The Hilbert system IK has the following axioms and rules:
• Axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic
11
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• the K-axioms
✷i(A→ B) → (✷iA→ ✷iB) (K)
for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, and the rules modus ponens and necessitation
A A→ B
B
(MP) and
A
✷iA
(NEC).
The system IT has, in addition, the truth-axioms
✷iA → A (T)
again for i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Finally, we obtain the system IS4 by adding to IT
the (4)-axioms
✷iA → ✷i✷iA (4)
As in classical modal logic, the truth axioms correspond to reﬂexivity
and the (4)-axioms to transitivity of the accessibility relations.
We deﬁne provability in these Hilbert systems as usual:
Definition 1.10 (Provability from assumptions). Let M be a set of for-
mulas. We say that the formula A is provable or derivable from M in a
given Hilbert system, written M ⊢ A (often with a subscript denoting the
Hilbert system) iﬀ there are ﬁnitely many formulas A1, . . . , An ∈ M such
that ⊢ A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → A.
Let ⊢ denote provability in one of the systems IK, IT or IS4. As
usual, the deduction theorem for each of these systems is an immediate
consequence of our notion of provability.
Lemma 1.11 (Deduction Theorem). For all formulas A,B and all sets of
formulas M (of the respective languge) we have:
M ∪ {A} ⊢ B ⇐⇒ M ⊢ A→ B.
Lemma 1.12 (Soundness of IK, IT and IS4). The systems IK, IT and
IS4 are sound w.r.to the appropriate class of models, i.e.
(a) ⊢IK A =⇒  A
(b) ⊢IT A =⇒ refl. A
12
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(c) ⊢IS4 A =⇒ refl., trans. A
Proof. By straightforward inductions on the derivations of A. We just
check the validity of the K-axioms, the other cases are left to the reader.
LetM be an EK-structure and w ∈W with w  ✷i(A→ B). We show that
this implies w  ✷iA → ✷iB, from which the claim follows. So let v ≥ w
such that v  ✷iA. By deﬁnition this means that u  A for all u ∈ Ri[v].
Since w  ✷i(A → B), it follows by monotonicity that v  ✷i(A → B),
i.e. u  A → B for all u ∈ Ri[v], and therefore u  B for all u ∈ Ri[v], so
u  ✷iB.
Definition 1.13. Given any proof system S, let ⊢ denote provability in
this system. We call a set of formulas P S-prime iﬀ it satisﬁes the following
conditions:
(i) P has the disjunction property, i.e., A∨B ∈ P =⇒ A ∈ P or B ∈ P ;
(ii) P is deductively closed, i.e., for any formula A, if P ⊢ A, then A ∈ P ;
(iii) P is consistent, i.e., ⊥ /∈ P .
If the system is clear form the context, we will also simply speak of prime
sets instead of S-prime sets.
The following lemma will be needed to show the prime lemma, which
in turn is the primary tool for the completeness proof via canonical models.
Lemma 1.14 (Disjunction Lemma). Let N be an arbitrary set of formulas,
A,B and C be formulas, and let ⊢ denote provability in one of the systems
IK, IT or IS4. If
N ∪ {A} ⊢ C and N ∪ {B} ⊢ C, then N ∪ {A ∨B} ⊢ C.
Proof. Assume that N∪{A} ⊢ C and N∪{B} ⊢ C. By deﬁnition, there are
ﬁnitely many formulas A1, . . . , An ∈ N∪{A} such that ⊢ A1∧· · ·∧An → C
and B1, . . . , Bm ∈ N ∪ {B} such that ⊢ B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bm → C. W.l.o.g. we
can assume that Ai 6= A for all i = 1, . . . , n, Bj 6= B for all j = 1, . . . ,m
and
⊢ A1 ∧ · · · ∧An ∧A→ C and ⊢ B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm ∧B → C.
13
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By intuitionistic propositional logic we have for all formulas D,E and F
((D → F ) ∧ (E → F ))→ (D ∨ E → F )
so it follows by propositional reasoning that
⊢ (A1 ∧ · · · ∧An ∧A) ∨ (B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm ∧B)→ C.
it follows that
⊢ (A1∧· · ·∧An∧B1∧· · ·∧Bm∧A)∨(A1∧· · ·∧An∧B1∧· · ·∧Bm∧B)→ C.
Also, in intuitionistic logic we have the distributive laws, so it follows by
propositional reasoning that
⊢ (A1 ∧ · · · ∧An ∧B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm) ∧ (A ∨B)→ C.
Since A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm ∈ N , it follows by deﬁnition that
N ∪ {A ∨B} ⊢ C.
Lemma 1.15. For each n ≥ 1 and all formulas A1, . . . , An and B:
⊢ Ai → B for all i = 1, . . . , n =⇒ ⊢
n∨
i=1
Ai → B
Proof. Using induction on n and the lemma above.
n = 1: Immediately.
n→ n+1: Assume that ⊢ Ai → B for all i = 1, . . . , n+1. By I.H. it
follows that ⊢
∨n
i=1Ai → B. Using the previous lemma with N = ∅,
we get that ⊢
∨n
i=1Ai ∨An+1 → B, which is what we had to show.
The following prime lemma describes a crucial property of prime sets.
It holds for IK, IT as well as for IS4.
14
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Lemma 1.16 (Prime lemma). Suppose that N 0 B for some set of for-
mulas N and some formula B. Then there exists a prime set P such that
N ⊆ P and P 0 B.
Proof. Let (An)n∈N be an enumeration of all formulas. Now we inductively
deﬁne the sets Nn for each n ∈ N:
N0 := N,
Nn+1 :=
{
Nn ∪ {An} if Nn ∪ {An} 0 B,
Nn if Nn ∪ {An} ⊢ B.
and ﬁnally
P :=
⋃
n∈N
Nn
Now we show by induction on n that for all n ∈ N : Nn 0 B and, therefore,
P 0 B.
n = 0. Then N0 = N 0 B by assumption.
n→ n+ 1. We proceed by the following case distinction.
1.case: Nn ∪ {An} 0 B. Then by deﬁnition Nn+1 = Nn ∪ {An} 0 B.
2.case: Nn∪{An} ⊢ B. Then Nn+1 = Nn, and by I.H. we have Nn 0 B.
It remains to show that P is prime. We have the following:
• ⊥ /∈ P : We have P 0 B, hence ⊥ /∈ N⋆.
• P is deductively closed: Assume it is not, i.e., there is a formula A
with
P ⊢ A but A /∈ P
Since P ⊢ A but P 0 B, we know that
P ∪ {A} 0 B
Otherwise, by the Deduction Theorem 3.41
P ⊢ A→ B and P ⊢ A
15
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so by propositional reasoning,
P ⊢ B, which contradicts our observation above.
Since (An)n∈N is an enumeration of all formulas, there is some i such
that A = Ai. But then
Ni ∪ {Ai} 0 B.
So by construction
Ni+1 = Ni ∪ {Ai}
and, therefore,
A = Ai ∈ Ni+1 ⊆ P,
which contradicts our assumption.
• P has the disjunction property: Assume that C∨D ∈ P . Then there
is some i such that C ∨D = Ai and there are i1, i2 such that
C = Ai1 and D = Ai2
Now we have
P = P ∪ {C ∨D} 0 B
By the lemma above it follows that
P ∪ {C} 0 B or P ∪ {D} 0 B
In the ﬁrst case, we have that
Ni1 ∪ {Ai1} 0 B
so by the deﬁnition of Ni1+1,
Ni1+1 = Ni1 ∪ {Ai1} = Ni1 ∪ {C}
which means that C ∈ Ni1+1 and therefore C ∈ P . The second case
is analogous.
Remark 1.17. We will use several versions of this lemma: for IK, IT, IS4,
16
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for the logics with distributed knowledge IDK and IDT, and for a logic of
common knowledge ICK. Inspecting the proof of this lemma, we see that
the modal logic in question plays no role in the proof, so essentially the
same proof works for all intuitionistic modal logics, and for intuitionistic
justiﬁcation logics as well. The prime lemma really just depends on the
underlying propositional logic, in our case intuitionistic propositional logic.
Remark 1.18. In the following, we will use P,Q,R (possibly with sub-
scripts) to denote prime sets of formulas of the relevant language.
Now we introduce syntactic EK-structures that are based on prime
sets, which will serve as the worlds of the canonical models. This is a
standard approach to proving completeness of intuitionistic modal systems
also used in, for example, Fischer Servi [Fis84] and Simpson [Sim94].
Definition 1.19 (Canonical model for IK). The canonical model for IK
is the (ℓ+ 3) tuple
C = (W,⊆,R1, . . . ,Rℓ,V),
where we deﬁne:
(Can.1) W := {P | P is an IK-prime set of formulas},
(Can.2) P Ri Q :⇐⇒ ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q for i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
(Can.3) V :W → P(Prop) is the function given by
V(Q) := {p ∈ Prop | p ∈ Q} = Prop ∩Q
It is easy to check that C is an EK-structure of order ℓ.
Lemma 1.20. The canonical model C is an EK-structure of order ℓ.
Proof. We have to check the three conditions (EK.1), (EK.2) and (EK.3)
on EK-structures.
(EK.1) Since 0ICK ⊥, it follows by the prime lemma 1.16 that there is a
prime set P . So W 6= ∅. Also, the relation ⊆ is a preorder on W.
(EK.2) Let P ⊆ Q. We have to show that Ri[Q] ⊆ Ri[P ], so let R ∈ Ri[Q]
which means that QRiR which by deﬁnition is ✷
−1
i Q ⊆ R. Since
P ⊆ Q, it follows by lemma 1.3 that ✷−1i P ⊆ ✷
−1
i Q and therefore
✷
−1
i P ⊆ R, i.e. P RiR i.e. R ∈ Ri[P ].
17
1. Intuitionistic versions of K, T and S4
(EK.3) Assume that P ⊆ Q. Then we have
V(P ) = Prop ∩ P ⊆ Prop ∩Q = V(Q).
Lemma 1.21 (Truth lemma for IK). Let C = (W,⊆,R1, . . . ,Rℓ,V) be
the canonical model for IK. Then we have for all A and all P ∈ W that
A ∈ P ⇐⇒ (C, P )  A.
Proof. We establish this equivalence by induction on the structure of A
and distinguish the following cases.
(i) It trivially holds in case that A is the logical constant ⊥ or an atomic
proposition.
(ii) A = B ∧ C. Assume that B ∧ C ∈ P . Since P is deductively closed,
we have B ∈ P and C ∈ P , so it follows by the induction hypothesis
that (C, P )  B and (C, P )  C.
For the other direction assume that (C, P )  B ∧ C, so (C, P )  B
and (C, P )  C. By the induction hypothesis, we get that B ∈ P and
C ∈ P . Since P is deductively closed, it follows that B ∧ C ∈ P .
(iii) A = B ∨ C. Assume that B ∨ C ∈ P . Since P has the disjunc-
tion property, it follows that B ∈ P or C ∈ P , so by the induction
hypothesis, (C, P )  B or (C, P )  C, so (C, P )  B ∨ C.
For the other direction assume that (C, P )  B ∨ C. Then
(C, P )  B or (C, P )  C,
so by the induction hypothesis, B ∈ P or C ∈ P . Since P is deduc-
tively closed, it follows that B ∨ C ∈ P .
(iv) A is of the form B1 → B2. We ﬁrst assume that
B1 → B2 ∈ P, P ⊆ Q ∈ W, and (C, Q)  B1.
Then we have B1 → B2 ∈ Q and (by the induction hypothesis)
B1 ∈ Q. Since Q is deductively closed, this yields B2 ∈ Q and
18
1.2. The Hilbert systems IK, IT and IS4
thus again by the induction hypothesis that (C, Q)  B2. Q has
been an arbitrary superset of P within W, and thus we conclude
(C, P )  B1 → B2.
Now assume (C, P )  B1 → B2 and B1 → B2 /∈ P . Since P is
deductively closed, we have P ∪ {B1} 0IK B2. By the prime lemma
there exists a prime Q ∈ W such that
P ∪ {B1} ⊆ Q and Q 0IK B2, hence B2 /∈ Q.
Together with the induction hypothesis we thus obtain
(C, Q)  B1 and (C, Q) 2 B2.
Since P ⊆ Q, this contradicts (C, Q)  B1 → B2.
(v) A is of the form ✷iB. For the direction from left to right assume
✷iB ∈ P and ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q
for an arbitrary Q ∈ W. This implies B ∈ Q, and in view of the
induction hypothesis we thus have (C, Q)  B. Therefore, (C, P ) 
✷iB.
For the converse direction we assume (C, P )  ✷iB. We ﬁrst claim
that
✷
−1
i P ⊢IK B. (*)
To establish this claim, assume for a contradiction that ✷−1i P 0IK B.
According to the prime lemma we thus have a Q ∈ W such that
✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q and Q 0IK B. In particular, B /∈ Q. By the induction
hypothesis, this yields (C, Q) 2 B; a contradiction to (C, P )  ✷iB
and ✷−1i P ⊆ Q.
From (*) we conclude that there are C1, . . . , Cn ∈ ✷
−1
i P such that
⊢IK C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn → B.
Using necessitation, we have
⊢IK ✷i(C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn → B)
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and by using the K-axioms and propositional reasoning we get
⊢IK ✷iC1 ∧ · · · ∧✷iCn → ✷iB,
with ✷iC1, . . . ,✷iCn ∈ P , implying that P ⊢IK ✷iB. Hence ✷iB ∈
P since P is deductively closed.
For the systems IT and IS4, we proceed similarly, using the corre-
sponding notions of derivability and prime set and checking in addition
that the resulting canonical models are reﬂexive resp. reﬂexive and transi-
tive.
Lemma 1.22 (Completeness of IK, IT and IS4). The systems IK, IT
and IS4 are complete w.r.to the appropriate classes of models, i.e.
(a)  A =⇒ ⊢IK A
(b) ref A =⇒ ⊢IT A
(c) ref ,tr A =⇒ ⊢IS4 A
Proof. We only show the ﬁrst assertion and proceed by contraposition.
Assume that 0IK A. By the prime lemma for IK, there exists a prime set
P such that
P 0IK A
in particular, A /∈ P . It follows by the truth lemma that
(C, P ) 2 A,
which implies that 2 A.
The other assertions are shown similarly, using the respective versions of
the prime lemma, canonical model and truth lemma.
1.3. Comparison with previous approaches
In the last part of this ﬁrst general chapter on intuitionistic modal log-
ics, we compare our semantics to some common approaches in the litera-
ture, in particular that of Fischer Servi, Plotkin and Stirling, and Simp-
son. The material of this section is based on [JM16b]. The mentioned
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authors impose certain restrictions on their frames to deal with the inter-
play between ✷- and ✸-formulas. Since we work in multi-agent versions
of the ✷-fragment, we do not need these frame conditions. Intuitionis-
tic logic requires monotonicity, and in Fischer Servi [Fis84], Plotkin and
Stirling [PS86], and Simpson [Sim94] this is done by building it into the
truth deﬁnition. To make this distinction precise, we call an (ℓ+ 3)-tuple
M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) a pre-EK-structure iﬀ it satisﬁes the properties
(EK.1) and (EK.3) of an EK-structure; i.e. the monotonicity condition
(EK.2) is dropped. Hence pre-EK-structures correspond to multi-agent
versions of the structures considered in [Fis84, PS86, Sim94]. For a pre-
EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ), the notion of truth in the sense
of Fischer Servi, Plotkin and Stirling, and Simpson is inductively deﬁned
in analogy to truth for EK- structures on page 9 with the only diﬀerence
that now, for a pre-EK-structure M,
(M, w) ⋆ ✷iA : ⇐⇒ (M, u) ⋆ A for all u ∈
⋃
w≤v
Ri[v]
These semantic diﬀerences are not substantial, however: We are now
going to show that the corresponding notions of validity coincide.
Lemma 1.23. For each EK-structure M, each w ∈ W and each formula
A
(M, w)  A ⇐⇒ (M, w) ⋆ A
Proof. We proceed by induction on A. The only interesting case is when
A = ✷iB. Then we have
w  ✷iB
def
⇐⇒ u  B for all u ∈ Ri[w]
I.H.
⇐⇒ u ⋆ B for all u ∈ Ri[w]. Now
we observe that since have w ≤ v =⇒ Ri[v] ⊆ Ri[w], it follows that⋃
v≤w
Ri[w] ⊆ Ri[v] and therefore
⋃
v≤w
Ri[w] = Ri[v]
so we have u ⋆ B for all u ∈ Ri[w]⇐⇒ u ⋆ B for all u ∈
⋃
w≤v Ri[v]
def
⇐⇒
u ⋆ ✷iB.
Clearly, there are pre-EK-structures that are not EK-structures. How-
ever, it easy to transform them into EK-structures that validate the same
formulas.
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Definition 1.24 (Completion of a pre-EK structure). Let M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) be a pre-EK structure. Its completion M↑ is deﬁned
as the structure
M
↑ := (W,≤, R↑1, . . . , R
↑
ℓ , V ) with R
↑
i [w] :=
⋃
w≤v
Ri[v]
Forming the completion of a pre-EK-structure turns it into an EK-
structure.
Lemma 1.25. For each pre-EK-structure M, its completion M↑ is an
EK-structure.
Proof. We only have to check that if w ≤ v, then R↑i [v] ⊆ R
↑
i [w] for each
i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Since w ≤ v, we have {u ∈ W | v ≤ u} ⊆ {u ∈ W | w ≤ u}
and therefore
R↑i [v] =
⋃
v≤u
Ri[u] ⊆
⋃
w≤u
Ri[u] = R
↑
i [w].
Corollary 1.26. The two notions of validity  and ⋆ are equivalent, i.e.
for each formula A of LK we have
 A ⇐⇒ ⋆ A
Proof. Assume that 2 A, so there is an EK-structure M and a point w of
M such that (M, w) 2 A. By the previous lemmas, M is also a pre-EK-
structure and (M, w) 2⋆ A and therefore 2⋆ A. For the other direction
assume that 2⋆ A, so there is a pre-EK-structure M and a point w of M
such that (M, w) 2⋆ A. By the lemmas above, we have that M↑ is an
EK-structure and (M↑, w) 2 A, so 2 A.
Since pre-EK-validity for LK formulas is the same as validity deﬁned
by Fischer Servi, Plotkin and Stirling, and Simpson, our semantics for
intuitionistic common knowledge builds on established semantic concepts.
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In this chapter, we extend our modal language LK by the modality D for
distributed knowledge. We will show soundness and completeness for two
logics of intuitionistic distributed knowledge. The results of this chapter
are based on [JM16a].
Roughly, A is distributed knowledge in a group of agents if the agents
could come to know A when they would combine their individual knowl-
edge. Distributed knowledge is, so to speak, “distributed in the group
of agents”. Alternatively, one can think of distributed knowledge as the
knowledge of a “wise man” who knows everything that the agents in the
group know.
The way this is modelled in Kripke models can be thought of as fol-
lows: The group considers a world possible only if all the agents consider
it possible. Put diﬀerently, the group of agents rejects all worlds as pos-
sible that (at least) one of the agents rejects. In this way they combine
their ability to exclude worlds, which corresponds to them combining their
knowledge.
Some authors consider operators DG for each subgroup G ⊆ {1, . . . , ℓ}
of the agents. We restrict ourselves to the modality D which corresponds
to D{1,...,ℓ}, that is, knowledge which is distributed in the whole group of
agents.
2.1. The language LDK and its semantics
The language LDK is obtained from adding the modal operator D to the
language LK , and we extend the inductive deﬁnition of the set of formulas
by
if A is a formula of LDK , so is DA.
As for the modal operators ✷1, . . . ,✷ℓ, we set, for any set of formulas
M ,
DM := {DA | A ∈M} and D−1M := {A | DA ∈M}
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Given the EK-structure of order ℓ
M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ),
A is considered to be distributed knowledge in world w iﬀ A holds in those
worlds that are accessible for all agents 1, . . . , ℓ from w.
We extend the deﬁnition of satisfaction at a point of a model by the
following clause:
Definition 2.1 (Satisfaction). We extend the satisfaction / truth deﬁni-
tion for EK-structures by
(M, w)  DA iﬀ (M, v)  A for all v ∈
n⋂
i=1
Ri[w]
We brieﬂy check that adding the D operator does not violate our mono-
tonicity condition.
The next lemma states the monotonicity for formulas of the form DA.
Lemma 2.2. For all EK-structures M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) of order ℓ,
all elements w, v ∈W , and all formulas A of LDK we have that
(M, w)  DA, w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  DA.
Proof. Assume that (M, w)  DA and w ≤ v. Now let u ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[v].
Since Ri[v] ⊆ Ri[w] for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ, it follows that
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[v] ⊆⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w] and therefore u ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w], so by our assumption we have
(M, u)  A and therefore (M, v)  DA.
It follows that we still have monotonicity.
Lemma 2.3 (Monotonicity for intuitionistic distributed knowledge). For
every formula A of LDK we have that
(M, w)  A, w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  A
Proof. By a simple induction on A. The only interesting case is when
A = DB, which is treated in the lemma above.
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2.2. The Hilbert systems IDK and IDT
We now introduce the Hilbert system IDK. It has all the axioms and
rules of inference of the system IK for the extended language LDK , and in
addition the following two axioms:
D(A→ B) → (DA→ DB), (D1)
✷iA→ DA, (D2)
always for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ and all formulas A,B of LDK . Because of (D1)
the operator D is normal, which means that distributed knowledge is closed
under logical inference. Also, in view of (D2) anything known by any agent
is distributed knowledge.
Because of (D2) and (NEC) the necessitation rule for D
A
DA
is derivable in IDK : Assume that ⊢IDK A. Then by necessitation  ✷iA.
By D2 we have  ✷iA → DA, so by modus ponens we have ⊢IDK DA.
The axiomsD1 andD2 are EK-valid, which follows from the intersection-
interpretation of D. This is shown in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2.4 (Validity of D1). For all formulas A and B we have
 D(A→ B) → (DA→ DB)
Proof. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) be an EK-structure, w ∈ W and
assume that w  D(A → B). We show that this implies w  DA → DB.
So let v ≥ w with v  DA, and let u ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[v]. It follows by deﬁnition
that u  A. Since w ≤ v, we have Ri[v] ⊆ Ri[w] for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
and therefore
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[v] ⊆
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w]. So u ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w] and therefore
u  A → B, and ﬁnally u  B. By deﬁnition, we have v  DB, so
we have shown w  DA → DB. We have shown that for each w ∈ W ,
w  D(A→ B) implies w  DA→ DB. It follows that for each w ∈W we
have w  D(A→ B)→ (DA→ DB).
Lemma 2.5 (Validity of D2). For all formulas A and all i = 1, . . . , ℓ we
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have
 ✷iA→ DA
Proof. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) be an EK-structure, w ∈ W and
i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Assume that w  ✷iA. By deﬁnition we have v  A for all
v ∈ Ri[w]. Since
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w] ⊆ Ri[w] for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, it follows that
v  A for each v ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w], so by deﬁnition w  DA. It follows that
w  ✷iA→ DA for each w ∈W and each i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
The theory IDT is obtained from IDK by adding the truth axiom
for distributed knowledge which states that the distributed knowledge of
A implies A, i.e.,
DA→ A (T)
for all A. In view of (D2) this implies the truth property ✷iA→ A for all
operators ✷i.
As for individual knowledge ✷i, one could argue that the truth axiom
is needed for distributed knowledge, and that IDK is at best a theory of
distributed belief (which may be an interesting concept in itself) than of
distributed knowledge. Again, we put such considerations aside and speak
of distributed knowledge only.
Those EK-structures of order ℓ in which all (T)-axioms are valid are
called (T)-models. The intended structures for IDT are reﬂexive EK-
structures, and (T) is obviously valid in those. However, there are non-
reﬂexive EK-structures of order ℓ in which all (T)-axioms are valid.
Lemma 2.6. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) be a reflexive EK-structure.
Then
(M, w)  DA→ A.
Proof. Let w be a point of M with w  DA. We show that w  A,
from which the claim follows. By deﬁnition, w  DA means that v  A
for all v ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w]. Since Ri is reﬂexive for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, we have
w ∈ Ri[w] for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, so w ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w] and therefore w  A.
We can now easily show the soundness of our systems IDK and IDK.
Theorem 2.7 (Soundness of IDK and IDT). For all formulas A of LDK
we have:
(a) ⊢IDK A =⇒  A.
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(b) ⊢IDT A =⇒ ref A.
Proof. By straightforward inductions on the derivations of A. The cases
where A is an axiom D1 or D2 is covered by the two previous lemmas.
As mentioned above, there exist non-reﬂexive (T)-models. Neverthe-
less, validity of (T) in EK-structures is closely related to reﬂexivity, as
shown in the following lemma. First we deﬁne the reﬂexive extension of
a model, which just replaces all accessibility relations with their reﬂexive
closures.
Definition 2.8. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) be an EK-structure of
order ℓ. The reflexive extension M of M is deﬁned to be the structure
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ),
where (for 1 = 1, . . . , ℓ) the relation Ri is deﬁned to be the reﬂexive closure
of Ri, i.e.,
Ri := Ri ∪ {(w,w) | w ∈W}
It is an easy observation that any (T)-model can be extendend to a
reﬂexive EK-structure of the same order.
Lemma 2.9. If M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) is a (T)-model, then M is a
reflexive EK-structure, and for all worlds w ∈ W and all formulas A we
have that
(M, w)  A ⇐⇒ (M, w)  A.
Proof. The reﬂexivity ofM is clear. The second part is proved by induction
on A. If A is the logical constant ⊥ or an atomic proposition, the assertion
is obvious; if A is a disjunction, a conjunction, or an implication it follows
directly from the induction hypothesis. Hence we can concentrate on the
cases that A is of the form ✷iB or DB.
(i) Let A be the formula ✷iB. The direction from left to right is evident.
So asssume (M, w)  ✷iB, from which we obtain
(M, v)  B for all v ∈ Ri[w].
M is a (T)-model, thus ✷iB → B is valid in M and our assumption also
yields (M, w)  B. From the induction hypothesis we obtain (M, u)  B
for all u ∈ Ri[w] ∪ {w} = Ri[w]. Therefore, (M, w)  ✷iB.
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(ii) Let A be the formula DB. The direction from left to right is evident
again. To show the converse direction, let (M, w)  DB. Hence we have
(M, v)  B for all v ∈
ℓ⋂
i=1
Ri[w].
Since M is a (T)-model, we also have (M, w)  B. Hence the induction
hypothesis implies (M, u)  B for all u ∈
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w] ∪ {w} =
⋂ℓ
i=1Ri[w].
This is what we had to show.
In order to avoid a trivial situation, we will assume in this section
that ℓ ≥ 2. In the case where ℓ = 1, the notion of distributed knowledge
is trivial in the sense that distributed knowledge in a group with a single
agent is the same as the knowledge of that single agent, i.e.
ℓ = 1 =⇒  ✷1A↔ DA
thus the completeness proof in that case is the same as for single-agent IK.
Remark 2.10. In this section, we assume that
the number of agents ℓ is at least 2.
2.3. Pseudo-validity
Now we build up some machinery that will lead to the canonical models
and the completeness proofs for the systems IDK and IDT in the next
section. Our method is motivated by the approach presented in Fagin,
Halpern, and Vardi [FHV92] and Wang and Ågotnes [WÅ11]. However,
our version is a signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation, tailored for the treatment of IDK
and IDT.
Our approach is based on the notion of pseudo-validity. We will in-
terpret the formulas of LDK in so-called pseudo-structures. These are EK-
structures of order (ℓ+1) where the operator D is interpreted by the addi-
tional binary accessibility relation Rℓ+1. Afterwards we will extend these
EK-structures of order (ℓ+ 1) to strict EK-structures of order (ℓ+ 1) and
then collapse these strict EK-structures of order (ℓ + 1) to EK-structures
of order ℓ, suitable for our purpose.
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Definition 2.11. Given an EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) of
order (ℓ + 1), the notion of pseudo-satisfaction ps of a formula A at a
point of a model is inductively deﬁned as follows: the clauses not involving
D are as in 1.5, and the clause for distributed knowledge in 2.1 is replaced
by
(M, w) ps DA :⇐⇒ (M, v) ps A for all v ∈ Rℓ+1[w]
As can be seen by a trivial induction on A we also have monotonicity
for pseudo-satisfaction.
Lemma 2.12. For every EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) of
order (ℓ+ 1), all elements w, v ∈W, and all A we have that
(M, w) ps A and w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v) ps A.
We say that A is pseudo-valid in the EK-structure M of order (ℓ+1),
written M ps A, iﬀ (M, w) ps A for all worlds w of M.
Since the operator D is interpreted by the relation Rℓ+1 in an EK-
structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) of order (ℓ + 1), the axioms (D2)
are not necessarily pseudo-valid in M. Those EK-structures of order (ℓ+1)
in which all (D2)-axioms are pseudo-valid are called (D2)-pseudo-models.
An EK-structure M of order (ℓ+1) is a (D2T)-pseudo-model iﬀ all (D2)-
axioms and all (T)-axioms are pseudo-valid in M.
Of course, for every EK-structureM of order ℓ there is an EK-structure
M
′ of order (ℓ+1) such that validity in M is equivalent to pseudo-validity
in M′. The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Deﬁnition 2.1
and Deﬁnition 2.11.
Lemma 2.13. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) be an EK-structure of order
ℓ and define
M
′ := (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ,
ℓ⋂
i=1
Ri, V ).
Then M′ is an EK-structure of order (ℓ+ 1) and for all w ∈W and all A
we have that
(M, w)  A ⇐⇒ (M′, w) ps A.
In particular, M′ is a (D2)-pseudo-model and if M is a (T)-model, then
M
′ is a (D2T)-pseudo-model.
29
2. Distributed Knowledge
Our next step is to transform a given EK-structure of order (ℓ + 1)
into an extended structure, called its strict extension. The purpose of this
extension is to enforce a well-controlled behavior of the intersection of the
accessibility relations. From now on we write I for the set {1, . . . , (ℓ+1)}.
Definition 2.14 (Strict extension). Given an EK-structure
M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V )
of order (ℓ+ 1), its strict extension is deﬁned to be the structure
M
♯ = (W ♯,≤♯, R♯1, . . . , R
♯
ℓ+1, V
♯),
where we set:
(♯1) W ♯ := W × I,
(♯2) ≤♯ := {((w, i), (v, j)) | w ≤ v and i, j ∈ I},
(♯3) R♯i := {((w, j), (v, i)) | v ∈ Ri[w] and j ∈ I} for any i ∈ I,
(♯4) V ♯((w, i)) := V (w) for any (w, i) ∈W ♯.
It is obvious that M♯ is an EK-structure of order (ℓ + 1). Further
properties of strict extensions are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.15. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) be an EK-structure of
order (ℓ+ 1). Then we have:
(a) If i and j are different elements of I, then R♯i [(w, k)]∩R
♯
j [(w, k)] = ∅
for any (w, k) ∈W ♯.
(b)
⋂ℓ
i=1R
♯
i [(w, k)] = ∅ for any (w, k) ∈W
♯.
Proof. The second assertion is an immediate consequence of the ﬁrst since
we deal with at least two agents. The ﬁrst assertion follows from (♯3), which
claims that all elements of W ♯ accessible from (w, k) via R♯i are of the form
(v, i) and those accessible from (w, k) via R♯j are of the form (u, j).
The following important lemma shows that the strict extension of an
EK-structure of order (ℓ+ 1) does not aﬀect the class of pseudo-valid for-
mulas.
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Lemma 2.16. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) be an EK-structure of
order (ℓ+ 1). Then we have for all (w, i) ∈W ♯ and all A that
(M, w) ps A ⇐⇒ (M♯, (w, i)) ps A.
Proof. We show this claim by induction on the structure of A and distin-
guish the following cases.
(i) A is the logical constant ⊥ or an atomic proposition. Then the situation
is clear.
(ii) A is a disjunction or a conjunction. Then we simply have to apply the
induction hypothesis.
(iii) A is of the form B → C. To show the direction from left to right we
assume (M, w) ps B → C and thus have
(M, v) ps B =⇒ (M, v) ps C for all v such that w ≤ v. (2.1)
In order to prove (M♯, (w, i)) ps B → C, we pick an arbitrary (u, j) ∈
W ♯ for which (w, i) ≤♯ (u, j) and (M♯, (u, j)) ps B. By the induction
hypothesis we obtain (M, u) ps B, and in view of the deﬁnition of ≤♯ we
also have w ≤ u. Hence 2.1 gives us (M, u) ps C, and a further application
of the induction hypothesis yields (M♯, (u, j)) ps C, as we had to show.
The proof of the converse directions follows exactly the same pattern.
(iv) A is of the form ✷jB. For establishing the direction from left to right
assume (M, w) ps ✷jB, yielding that
(M, v) ps B for all v ∈ Rj [w]. (2.2)
Now we pick an arbitrary element (u, k) of R♯j [(w, i)]. According to the
deﬁnition of R♯j this implies that u ∈ Rj [w], and in view of 2.2, we thus
obtain (M, u) ps B. Now we can apply the induction hypothesis and have
(M♯, (u, k)) ps B. Therefore, (M♯, (w, i)) ps ✷jB.
For the converse direction we proceed from (M♯, (w, i)) ps ✷jB, i.e. from
(M♯, (v, j)) ps B for all (v, j) ∈ R♯j [(w, i)]. (2.3)
Given any element u of Rj [w], we obtain (u, j) ∈ R
♯
j [(w, i)], so 2.3 implies
(M♯, (u, j)) ps B. Applying the induction hypothesis then immediately
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leads to (M, u) ps B. Hence we have (M, w) ps ✷jB.
(v) A is of the form DB. This case can be handled as the previous case
since D is interpreted by the relations Rℓ+1 and R
♯
ℓ+1, respectively.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is that the property of being
a (D2)-pseudo-model or a (D2T)-pseudo-model is inherited from an EK-
structure M to its strict extension M♯.
Corollary 2.17. If M is a (D2)-pseudo-model, then M♯ is a (D2)-pseudo-
model as well; if M is a (D2T)-pseudo-model, then also M♯ is a (D2T)-
pseudo-model.
The strict extensions of (D2)-pseudo-models have a further property
that will be needed in the proof of Lemma 2.20.
Lemma 2.18. Let M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) be a (D2)-pseudo-model
and j one of the numbers 1, . . . , ℓ. Then we have for all (w, i), (v, k) ∈W ♯
and all A that
(M♯, (w, i)) ps ✷jA and
(v, k) ∈ (R♯j ∪R
♯
ℓ+1)[(w, i)]
}
=⇒ (M♯, (v, k)) ps A.
Proof. Since M♯ is a (D2)-pseudo-model, (M♯, (w, i)) ps DA follows from
the assumption (M♯, (w, i)) ps ✷jA. In this pseudo-model the operator
D is interpreted by means of the accessibility relation R♯ℓ+1, hence the
conclusion is an immediate consequence.
EK-structures of order (ℓ+ 1) provide only intermediate tools for the
canonical model construction. In the end we are interested in EK-stuctures
of order ℓ, and in order to build those, we now collapse EK-structures M
of order (ℓ + 1) to so-called associated structures M⋆ of order ℓ, via their
strict extensions M♯.
Definition 2.19 (Associated structure). Given an EK-structure
M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V )
of order (ℓ+1), the structure associated with M is deﬁned to be the struc-
ture
M
⋆ = (W ⋆,≤⋆, R⋆1, . . . , R
⋆
ℓ , V
⋆),
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where we set:
(a) W ⋆ := W ♯, ≤⋆ := ≤♯, V ⋆ := V ♯,
(b) R⋆i := R
♯
i ∪R
♯
ℓ+1 for i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
It is clear thatM⋆ is an EK-structure of order ℓ. The decisive property
of this construction is that validity with respect to the structure associated
with an EK-structure M of order (ℓ + 1) coincides with pseudo-validity
with respect to its strict extension M♯.
Lemma 2.20. Given a (D2)-pseudo-model M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ),
we have for all (w, i) ∈W ♯ and all A that
(M⋆, (w, i))  A ⇐⇒ (M♯, (w, i)) ps A.
Proof. The proof of this equivalence is by induction on the structure of A.
We distinguish the following cases:
(i) A is the logical constant ⊥ or an atomic proposition. Then the claim
follows immediately.
(ii) A is a disjunction, a conjunction, or an implication. Then we simply
have to apply the induction hypothesis.
(iii) A is of the form ✷jB. In view of the deﬁnition of R⋆j , the direction from
left to right is obtained by a straightforward application of the induction
hypothesis. For proving the converse direction, assume (M♯, (w, i)) ps
✷jB. However, then Lemma 2.18 implies (M♯, (v, k)) ps B for all elements
(v, k) of (R♯j ∪R
♯
ℓ+1)[(w, i)] = R
⋆
j [(w, i)]. For all those (v, k) the induction
hypothesis yields (M⋆, (v, k))  B , and thus we have (M⋆, (w, i))  ✷jB.
(iv) A is of the form DB. Now we observe that⋂ℓ
j=1R
⋆
j [(w, i)] =
⋂ℓ
j=1(R
♯
j ∪R
♯
ℓ+1)[(w, i)]
= (
ℓ⋂
j=1
R♯j [(w, i)])︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∅
∪R♯ℓ+1[(w, i)] = R
♯
ℓ+1[(w, i)],
where
⋂ℓ
j=1R
♯
j [(w, i)]) = ∅ follows from Lemma 2.15. Hence the operator
D is interpreted in M⋆ as in M♯ , and our assertion is immediate from the
induction hypothesis.
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We now come to the main theorem of this section. It is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 2.16 and the previous lemma.
Theorem 2.21. If M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ+1, V ) is a (D2)-pseudo-model,
then we have for all (w, i) ∈W ♯ and all formulas A of LDK that
(M, w) ps A ⇐⇒ (M⋆, (w, i))  A.
In particular, if M is a (D2T)-pseudo-model, then M⋆ is a (T)-model.
2.4. Prime sets and completeness
In the following, we let ID• stand for one of the theories IDK or IDT so
we can talk about both of them at once.
In the following, we adapt the standard approach of proving complete-
ness for intuitionistic modal systems to our logic with distributed knowl-
edge.
The following prime lemma can be shown in a similar way than the
prime lemma for IK.
Lemma 2.22 (Prime lemma). Suppose that N 6⊢ID• A for some set of
formulas N and some formula A. Then there exists an ID•-prime set P
such that N ⊆ P and P 6⊢ID• A.
Relative to the theory ID• we now introduce the canonical EK-structure
C. In order to keep the notation readable, we refrain from explicitly men-
tioning ID• (for example as sub- or superscript), but it should always be
clear from the context to which theory we refer.
Definition 2.23 (Canonical structure). The canonical structure for ID•
is the (ℓ+ 4) tuple
C = (W,⊆,R1, . . . ,Rℓ+1,V),
where we deﬁne:
(a) W := {P | P is an ID•-prime set of formulas},
(b) P Ri Q :⇐⇒ ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q for any i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
(c) P Rℓ+1 Q :⇐⇒ D−1P ⊆ Q,
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(d) V :W → P(Prop) is the function given by
V(Q) := {p ∈ Prop | p ∈ Q}.
It is evident that C is an EK-structure of order (ℓ + 1). All further
relevant properties follow more or less directly from the following truth
property.
Lemma 2.24 (Truth lemma). Let C = (W,⊆,R1, . . . ,Rℓ+1,V) be the
canonical structure for ID•. Then we have for all A and all P ∈ W that
A ∈ P ⇐⇒ (C, P ) ps A.
Proof. We establish this equivalence by induction on the structure of A
and distinguish the following cases.
(i) It trivially holds in case that A is the logical constant ⊥ or an atomic
proposition.
(ii) If A is a disjunction or a conjunction it follows from the induction
hypothesis and the properties of ID•-prime sets.
(iii) A is of the form B1 → B2. We ﬁrst assume that
B1 → B2 ∈ P, P ⊆ Q ∈ W, and (C, Q) ps B1.
Then we have B1 → B2 ∈ Q and (by the induction hypothesis) B1 ∈
Q. Since Q is deductively closed, this yields B2 ∈ Q and thus again by the
induction hypothesis that (C, Q) ps B2. Q has been an arbitrary superset
of P within W, and thus we conclude (C, P ) ps B1 → B2.
Now assume (C, P ) ps B1 → B2 and B1 → B2 /∈ P . Since P is deductively
closed, we have P ∪ {B1} 6⊢ID• B2. By the prime lemma there exists a
Q ∈ W such that
P ∪ {B1} ⊆ Q and Q 6⊢ID• B2, hence B2 /∈ Q.
Together with the induction hypothesis we thus obtain
(C, Q) ps B1 and (C, Q) 6ps B2.
Since P ⊆ Q, this contradicts (C, Q) ps B1 → B2.
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(iv) A is of the form ✷iB. For the direction from left to right assume
✷iB ∈ P and ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q
for an arbitrary Q ∈ W. This implies B ∈ Q, and in view of the induction
hypothesis we thus have (C, Q) ps B. Therefore, (C, P ) ps ✷iB.
For the converse direction we assume (C, P ) ps ✷iB. We ﬁrst claim that
✷
−1
i P ⊢ID• B. (*)
To establish this claim, assume for a contradiction that ✷−1i P 6⊢ID• B.
According to the prime lemma we thus have a Q ∈ W such that ✷−1i P ⊆ Q
and Q 6⊢ID• B. In particular, B /∈ Q. By the induction hypothesis, this
yields (C, Q) 6ps B; a contradiction to (C, P ) ps ✷iB and ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q.
From (*) we conclude that there are C1, . . . , Cn ∈ ✷
−1
i P such that
⊢ID• (C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn)→ B.
Thus we also have
⊢ID• (✷iC1 ∧ · · · ∧✷iCn)→ ✷iB,
with ✷iC1, . . . ,✷iCn ∈ P , implying that P ⊢ID• ✷iB. Hence ✷iB ∈ P
since P is deductively closed.
(v) A is of the form DB. Because of the pseudo-validity interpretation of
D, this case is treated exactly as the previous cases.
Corollary 2.25.
(a) If C is the canonical structure for IDK, then C is a (D2)-pseudo-
model.
(b) If C is the canonical structure for IDT, then C is a (D2T)-pseudo-
model.
Proof. We only have to remember that an IDK-prime set of formulas P
is deductively closed with respect to derivability in IDK and, therefore,
contains ✷iA→ DA for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ and all A. Analogously, any IDT-
prime set of formulas Q contains, in addition, the formulas DA → A for
any A. Thus the truth lemma implies our assertions.
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Now the stage is set, and combining what we have obtained so far, we
can state the following ﬁrst main result.
Theorem 2.26. Let C = (W,⊆,R1, . . . ,Rℓ+1,V) be the canonical struc-
ture for ID• and C⋆ the EK-structure of order ℓ associated with C. Then
we have for all ID•-prime sets of formulas P , all A, and all i = 1, . . . , ℓ
that
A ∈ P ⇐⇒ (C⋆, (P, i))  A.
Proof. In view of the truth lemma and Lemma 2.16 we have
A ∈ P ⇐⇒ (C, P ) ps A ⇐⇒ (C♯, (P, i)) ps A
for the strict extension C♯ of C. Furthermore, C♯ is a (D2)-pseudo-model
according to the previous corollary. Hence we can apply Lemma 2.20 and
see that
(C⋆, (P, i))  A ⇐⇒ (C♯, (P, i)) ps A.
Therefore, we have what we want.
Theorem 2.27 (Completeness). For all LDK -formulas A we have:
(a)  A =⇒ ⊢IDK A.
(b) ref A =⇒ ⊢IDT A.
Proof. For the ﬁrst assertion, assume  A and 6⊢IDK A. Note that then the
prime lemma thus tells us that there exists an IDK-prime set P for which
P 6⊢IDK A. Hence A /∈ P . Consider the canonical structure C for IDK
and the EK-structure C⋆ associated with C. According to Theorem 2.26
we have (C⋆, (P, i)) 2 A for i = 1, . . . , ℓ. This is a contradiction to  A.
We come to the second assertion. Now we assume ref A and 6⊢IDT A.
In this case the prime lemma gives us an IDT-prime set Q for which
Q 6⊢IDK A and, consequently, A /∈ Q. Now we work with the canonical
structure C for IDT and the EK-structure C⋆ associated with C. We see
that C is a (D2T)-pseudomodel by Corollary 2.25 and, consequently, C⋆
is a (T)-model by Theorem 2.21. In view of Theorem 2.26 we also have
(C⋆, (Q, i)) 2 A for any i = 1, . . . , ℓ. It only remains to move to the reﬂexive
extension C⋆ of C⋆ and to apply Lemma 2.9. It follows that (C⋆, (Q, i)) 2 A.
Since C⋆ is reﬂexive, this is a contradiction to ref A.
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Together with Theorem 2.7 we thus have that IDK and IDT are
sound and complete formalizations of intuitionistic distributed knowledge.
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This chapter is about intuitionistic common knowledge. We will present
two Hilbert systems and show their soundness and completeness with re-
spect to EK-structures and reﬂexive EK-structures, respectively.
Intuitively, A is common knowledge in a group of agents iﬀ everbody
knows A, everybody knows that everybody knows A, and so on. Alterna-
tively, A is common knowledge iﬀ the agents are in a situation S, everybody
knows A, and everybody knows that they are in the situation S. As we
will see later, a formal counterpart of this idea lies at the core of the com-
pleteness proof for common knowledge. This chapter is based on [JM16b].
3.1. The language LCK and its semantics
The formulas of LCK are deﬁned as the formulas of LK with the additional
clause
if A is a formula, then CA is a formula.
In the following, we will use the abbreviation
E(A) := ✷1A ∧ · · · ∧✷ℓA
in order to express that “everybody knows A” or “everybody believes A”,
depending on what the ✷iA are supposed to formalize. Again we will often
omit parentheses by writing EA instead of E(A).
In the traditional approach, put forward, for example, in Fagin, Halpern,
Moses, and Vardi [FHMV95], common knowledge CA of A is interpreted
as the inﬁnite conjunction
∧
{En(A) | n ≥ 1} of the iterations of everybody
knows A, where
E
0(A) := A and En+1(A) := E(En(A)).
This is appropriate as a semantic characterization of common knowledge,
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but there is a problem: Since our language is ﬁnite, we cannot have an
axiom of the form
CA ↔
∧
n≥1
E
n(A).
To overcome this complication, CA is typically axiomatized via the
ﬁxed point characterization
CA ↔ E(A ∧ CA),
more precisely as the greatest ﬁxed point of this equivalence. We will show
that, as for classical common knowledge, these two semantic approaches
are equivalent.
For the classical treatment of common knowledge, see Fagin, Halpern,
Moses, and Vardi [FHMV95], Meyer and van der Hoek [MvdH04], and
Sillari and Vanderschraaf [VG13]. See also [MSnt] for an overview of the
proof theory of common knowledge.
Definition 3.1. Assume thatM = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) is an EK-structure
and n a natural number.
(a) We say that there exists an M-path of length n from world w ∈W to
world v ∈W – written PathM(w, v, n) – iﬀ there exist u0, . . . , un ∈W
such that w = u0, v = un, and ui+1 ∈
⋃ℓ
j=1Rj [ui] for i = 0, . . . , n−1.
(b) ReachM(w, n) and ReachM(w) are deﬁned to be the collections of
all elements of W that are reachable from w ∈ W by an M-path of
length n and any M-path, respectively,
ReachM(w, n) := {v ∈W | PathM(w, v, n)},
ReachM(w) :=
⋃
m≥1
ReachM(w,m).
Remark 3.2. We make the following observations, where each one implies
the next:
• w ≤ w′ =⇒
⋃ℓ
j=1Rj [w
′] ⊆
⋃ℓ
j=1Rj [w]
• PathM(w′, v, 1), w ≤ w′ =⇒ PathM(w, v, 1)
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• PathM(w′, v, n), w ≤ w′ =⇒ PathM(w, v, n) for each n ∈ N
• w ≤ w′ =⇒ ReachM(w′, n) ⊆ ReachM(w, n) for each n ∈ N
• w ≤ w′ =⇒ ReachM(w′) ⊆ ReachM(w)
Definition 3.3 (Satisfaction). We extend the deﬁnition of satisfaction 1.5
of LK by the following clause:
(M, w)  CA ⇐⇒ (M, v)  A for all v ∈ ReachM(w)
Remark 3.4. Alternatively, we could deﬁne satisfaction in the following
equivalent way:
R :=
ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri and let R⋆ be the transitive closure of R.
Then
(M, w)  CA ⇐⇒ (M, v)  A for all v ∈ R⋆[w].
The next lemma states monotonicity for formulas of the form CA and
follows immediately by the remark about paths and reachability 3.2 above.
Lemma 3.5.
(M, w)  CA, w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  CA.
Again, we check that monotonicity still holds.
Lemma 3.6 (Monotonicity). For each formula A of LCK
(M, w)  A, w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  A
Proof. By induction on A. The only interesting case is when A = CB,
which is covered by the lemma above.
Next, we will have a closer look at the semantics of ﬁxpoints and preﬁx-
points. The main result will be that the denotation of common knowledge
is the greatest postﬁxpoint of a certain operator, which allows us to show
the soundness of the co-closure axiom and the induction rule. We follow
the approach in [FHMV95], adapted to our notations.
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Definition 3.7 (The operator OA). Let A be a formula of LCK and M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) an EK-structure. Then the operator
OA : P(W )→ P(W )
is deﬁned by
OA(X) := ‖E(A)‖M ∩
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆ X
}
for all X ⊆W .
The monotonicity of this operator follows immediately from the deﬁ-
nition:
Lemma 3.8. For each EK-structure M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) and each
formula A, the operator OA is monotone, i.e. for all X,Y ⊆W
X ⊆ Y =⇒ OA(X) ⊆ OA(Y )
For a function f : X → X we make use of the usual notation for
function iteration:
f0(x) := x and fn+1(x) := f(fn(x))
We recall the standard deﬁnitions of ﬁxpoints and postﬁxpoints:
Definition 3.9 (Fixpoint and postﬁxpoint). Let X be a set partially or-
dered by ≤ and f : X → X a function.
• x ∈ X is a fixpoint of f iﬀ f(x) = x.
• x ∈ X is a postfixpoint of f iﬀ x ≤ f(x).
We quote the following classical result by Knaster and Tarski, which
will allow us to speak of the greatest ﬁxpoint of our operator OA.
Theorem 3.10 (Knaster-Tarski). Let W be an arbitrary set. Each mono-
tone operator on f : P(W )→ P(W ) has a greatest postfixpoint which is its
greatest fixpoint.
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Now, since our operator OA is monotone, we can immediately apply
the theorem of Knaster-Tarski to it.
Corollary 3.11. For each formula A and each EK-structure M, the op-
erator OA has a greatest postfixpoint which is its greatest fixpoint.
Definition 3.12. Let W be an arbitrary set. f : P(W )→ P(W ) is called
downwards continuous iﬀ for all descending sequences N0 ⊇ N1 ⊇ N2 . . .
(Ni ⊆W for each i ∈ N) we have that
f
(⋂
n∈N
Nn
)
=
⋂
n∈N
f (Nn)
Lemma 3.13. If W is a set and f : P(W )→ P(W ) is downwards contin-
uous, then f is monotone.
Proof. Assume that f is downwards continuous, and let X,Y ∈ P(W ) with
X ⊆ Y . Then we have
Y ⊇ X ⊇ X ⊇ . . .
so it follows by the downwards continuity of f that
f(X) ∩ f(Y ) = f(X ∩ Y ) = f(X) and therefore f(X) ⊆ f(Y ).
The next lemma gives us a nice explicit description of the greatest
ﬁxpoint of downwards closed operators.
Lemma 3.14. If W is a set and f : P(W )→ P(W ) is downwards contin-
uous, then
gfp(f) =
⋂
n∈N
fn(W )
Proof. We ﬁrst show that (fn(W ))n∈N forms a descending chain, i.e. f0(W ) ⊇
f1(W ) ⊇ f2(W ) ⊇ . . . . We show by induction on n that fn(W ) ⊇
fn+1(W ).
n = 0. Then f0(W ) =W ⊇ f1(W ).
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n → n + 1. By I.H. we have that fn(W ) ⊇ fn+1(W ). Since f is
downwards continuous, it follows by the previous lemma 3.13 that f
is monotone, and therefore
fn+1(W ) = f(fn(W )) ⊇ f(fn+1(W )) = fn+2(W ).
Next, we show that
⋂
n∈N
fn(W ) is a ﬁxpoint of f . Because f is downwards
continuous, we have
f
(⋂
n∈N
fn(W )
)
=
⋂
n∈N
f(fn(W )) =
⋂
n∈N
fn+1(W ))
⋂
n∈N
fn(W )
Finally, we show that
⋂
n∈N
fn(W ) is the greatest ﬁxpoint of f . Let F be an
arbitrary ﬁxpoint of f . We show that F ⊆ fn(W ) for each n ∈ N. Again
we use induction on n.
n = 0. Then F ⊆W = f0(W ).
n→ n+1. By the I.H. we have F ⊆ fn(W ). Since f is monotone, it
follows that F
fixpoint
= f(F ) ⊆ f(fn(W )) = fn+1(W ).
From this it follows immediately that
F ⊆
⋂
n∈N
fn(W )
so
⋂
n∈N
fn(W ) is the greatest ﬁxpoint of f .
Lemma 3.15. For each formula A of LCK and each EK-structure M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ), the operator OA : P(W ) → P(W ) is downwards
continuous.
Proof. Let Mn ⊆W for all n ∈ N, and let M0 ⊇M1 ⊇ . . . be a descending
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chain. Then we have
OA
(⋂
n∈N
Mn
)
= ‖EA‖M ∩
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆
⋂
n∈N
Mn
}
= ‖EA‖M ∩
⋂
n∈N
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆Mn
}
=
⋂
n∈N
(
‖EA‖M ∩
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆Mn
})
=
⋂
n∈N
OA (Mn)
It follows that we can apply lemma 3.14 to our operator OA to get a
nice characterization of its greatest ﬁxpoint.
Corollary 3.16. For each formula A of LCK and each EK-structure M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V )
gfp(OA) =
⋂
n∈N
OnA(W ).
Lemma 3.17. For each formula A of LCK and each EK-structure M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V )
OnA(W ) = ‖E(A)‖M ∩ ‖E
n(A)‖M for all n ≥ 1
Proof. We proceed by induction on n.
n = 1. Then
O1A(W ) = OA(W ) =‖E(A)‖ ∩
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆W
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W
= ‖E(A)‖ = ‖E(A)‖ ∩ ‖E1(A)‖
45
3. Common Knowledge
n→ n+ 1. We can argue as follows:
On+1A (W ) = OA(O
n
A(W ))
I.H.
= OA(‖En(A)‖)
= ‖E(A)‖ ∩
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆ ‖En(A)‖
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=‖En+1(A)‖
=
= ‖E(A)‖ ∩ ‖En+1(A)‖.
Corollary 3.18. For each formula A of LCK and each EK-structure M =
(W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V )
gfp(OA) =
⋂
n≥1
‖En(A)‖M
Proof. Combining the previous observations, we have
gfp(OA)
3.16
=
⋂
n∈N
OnA(W ) = O
0
A(W ) ∩
⋂
n≥1
OnA(W ) =
=W ∩
⋂
n≥1
OnA(W ) =
⋂
n≥1
OnA(W )
3.17
=
⋂
n≥1
(‖E(A)‖ ∩ ‖En(A)‖) =
=
⋂
n≥1
‖En(A)‖.
The following lemma tells us that also over our (intuitionistic) EK-
structures common knowledge is handled as in the case of classical logic.
The proof of this lemma is similar to the classical case. For ease of notation,
it is formulated using the denotations of formulas, i.e. the set of worlds
where a formula holds true.
Lemma 3.19. For all EK-structures M = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ), all v ∈
W , and all natural numbers n we have:
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(a) w ∈ ‖En(A)‖M ⇐⇒ ReachM(w, n) ⊆ ‖A‖M.
(b) ‖CA‖M =
⋂
m≥1
‖Em(A)‖M.
(c) ‖CA‖M = gfp (OA)
(d) ‖CA‖M = ‖EA‖M ∩ ‖E(CA)‖M
Proof. (a) By induction on n.
n = 0. Then E0A = A, and v ∈ ReachM(w, 0) ⇐⇒ w = v, so
the claim follows immediately.
n→ n+ 1.
w  En+1A⇐⇒ w  E(EnA)⇐⇒
v  EnA for all v ∈
ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w]
I.H.
⇐⇒
u  A for all v ∈
ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] and all u ∈ ReachM(v, n)
u  A for all u ∈ ReachM(w, n+ 1)
(b) ⋂
m≥1
‖EmA‖ =
⋂
m≥1
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ v  A for all v ∈ ReachM(w,m)} =
=

w ∈W
∣∣∣ v  A for all v ∈ ⋃
m≥1
ReachM(w,m)

 = ‖CA‖.
(c)
‖CA‖
(b)
=
⋂
m≥1
‖EmA‖
3.18
= gfp(OA).
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(d)
‖CA‖
(c)
= OA(‖CA‖) = ‖EA‖ ∩
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣ ℓ⋃
i=1
Ri[w] ⊆ ‖CA‖
}
=
= ‖EA‖ ∩ ‖E(CA)‖.
As for IK in chapter one, we call an LCK formula A valid in the EK-
structure M iﬀ M  A. Accordingly, the EK-valid formulas are those LCK
formulas that are valid in all EK–structures. The question now is whether
there exists a deductive system that proves exactly the EK-valid formulas.
3.2. The Hilbert systems ICK and ICKT
There exist numerous formalisms for intuitionistic modal logic, ranging
from Hilbert-style systems to sequent calculi and frameworks dealing with
nested sequents. A series of those is presented in, e.g., Simpson [Sim94]
and Marin and Straßburger [MS14].
Since our goal is to show completeness via a canonical model construc-
tion, we choose to use a Hilbert system for ease of presentation.
Definition 3.20 (The systems ICK and ICKT). The system ICK has
all axioms and rules of IK for the language LCK , and in addition the axiom
CA → EA ∧ E(CA) (CCL)
and the induction rule for common knowledge
B → EA ∧ EB
B → CA
(IND).
The system ICKT has, in addition, the truth axioms
✷iA → A (T)
The following theorem list a series of important properties of ICK and
ICKT.
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Theorem 3.21. Let ICK• be the system ICK or the system ICKT. For
all LCK formulas A,B and all sets M,N of LCK formulas we have:
(a) ⊢ICK• A =⇒ ⊢ICK• EA.
(b) ⊢ICK• E(A→ B)→ (EA→ EB).
(c) ⊢ICK• A =⇒ ⊢ICK• CA.
(d) ⊢ICK• E(A) ∧ E(CA) → CA.
(e) ⊢ICK• E(A) ∧ E(CA)↔ CA.
Proof. (a) Assume that ⊢ICK• A. By applying necessitation, we get
⊢ICK• ✷iA for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ. It follows by propositional reasoning
that ⊢ICK•
ℓ∧
i=1
✷iA, i.e. ⊢ICK• EA.
(b) By the K-axioms we have ⊢ICK• ✷i(A → B) → (✷iA → ✷iB) for
all i = 1, . . . , ℓ. It follows by propositional reasoning in intuitionistic
logic that
⊢ICK•
ℓ∧
j=1
✷j(A→ B)→ (✷iA→ ✷iB) for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ
=⇒ ⊢ICK•
ℓ∧
i=1
✷i(A→ B)→
ℓ∧
i=1
(✷iA→ ✷iB)
=⇒ ⊢ICK•
ℓ∧
i=1
✷i(A→ B)→ (
ℓ∧
i=1
✷iA→
ℓ∧
i=1
✷iB)
=⇒ ⊢ICK• E(A→ B)→ (EA→ EB).
(c) Assume that ⊢ICK• A. By (a) it follows that ⊢ICK• EA. Now let ⊤
denote ¬⊥. Then we have that ⊢ICK• ⊤ → (EA ∧ E⊤). Applying
the induction rule we get ⊢ICK• ⊤ → CA, so ⊢ICK• CA.
(d) By the co-closure axiom we have that ⊢ICK• CA → (EA ∧ E(CA)).
It follows by (a) that
⊢ICK• E(CA→ (EA ∧ E(CA)))
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and then by (b) that
⊢ICK• E(CA)→ E(EA ∧ E(CA)).
By propositional reasoning we get
⊢ICK• EA ∧ E(CA)→ EA ∧ E(EA ∧ E(CA)).
Finally, we can apply the induction rule and obtain
⊢ICK• EA ∧ E(CA)→ CA.
(e) Follows immediately by (d) and the co-closure axiom.
Lemma 3.22 (Soundness of co-closure). The co-closure axiom holds in all
EK-structures:
 CA→ E(A) ∧ E(CA)
Proof. By lemma 1.8 it suﬃces to show that for each EK-structure M
‖CA‖M ⊆ ‖EA‖M ∩ ‖E(CA)‖M
which follows from lemma 3.19.
Lemma 3.23 (Soundness of induction rule). The induction rule is sound,
i.e.
 B → E(A) ∧ E(B) =⇒  B → CA
Proof. Assume that  B → E(A)∧E(B). Now letM = (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V )
be an EK-structure. Then we haveW = ‖B → E(A)∧E(B)‖M. According
to lemma 1.8, this is equivalent to
‖B‖M ⊆ ‖E(A) ∧ E(B)‖M.
We also observe that
OA(‖B‖M) = ‖E(A) ∧ E(B)‖M
and therefore ‖B‖M is a postﬁxpoint of the operator OA. By lemma 3.19,
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‖CA‖M is the greatest postﬁxpoint of this operator which means that
‖B‖M ⊆ ‖CA‖M
so it follows by lemma 1.8 that
‖B → CA‖M =W
i.e.
M  B → CA
and since M was arbitrary, we have that
 B → CA.
Using these lemmas, we can easily establish the soundness of the sys-
tems ICK and ICKT.
Theorem 3.24 (Soundness of ICK and ICKT). Let A a formula of LCK .
(a) ⊢ICK A =⇒  A
(b) ⊢ICKT A =⇒ ref A
Proof. By inductions on the length of the derivations. The cases where A
is an instance of the co-closure axiom or was derived by the induction rule
are covered in lemma 3.22 and 3.23.
3.3. Completeness of ICK and ICKT
In this section we show that ICK is complete with respect to EK-structures
and ICKT is complete with respect to reﬂexive EK-structures. Our ap-
proach is an adaptation of the completeness proof presented in Fagin,
Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [FHMV95] for a system of classical common
knowledge.
Until the end of this section we ﬁx an LCK formula A and build the
so-called canonical model with respect to A.
First, we deﬁne the fragment with respect to A. This is the ﬁnite set
of formulas from which we will build the worlds of the canonical model.
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Definition 3.25. Given a formula A of LCK , the fragment Frag(A) is the
collection of all LCK formulas that is inductively generated as follows:
(a) A,⊥ ∈ Frag(A).
(b) If B ∈ Frag(A), then all subformulas of B belong to Frag(A).
(c) If C(B) ∈ Frag(A), then E(B) and E(C(B)) belong to Frag(A).
We observe that Frag(A) is a ﬁnite set. The most important ingre-
dients of our canonical model with respect to A are the A-prime sets of
formulas. These are deﬁned similarly as the prime sets of formulas but live
in the fragment Frag(A).
Definition 3.26 (A-prime). A set P of LCK formulas is called A-prime
iﬀ it satisﬁes the following conditions:
(P.1) P ⊆ Frag(A).
(P.2) P is deductively closed w.r. to Frag(A):
B ∈ Frag(A) and P ⊢ICK B =⇒ B ∈ P .
(P.3) P has the disjunction property:
B ∨ C ∈ P =⇒ B ∈ P or C ∈ P .
(P.4) P is consistent: ⊥ /∈ P .
Similar as for the logic IK, where we used prime sets of formulas as
the worlds of the canonical model, the A-prime sets of LCK formulas will
form the worlds of the canonical model depending on A. The next lemma
is an analogue of the prime lemma, formulated for A-prime sets. Its can
be proved in a similar way to the prime lemma for LK .
Lemma 3.27 (A-Prime lemma). Suppose that N ⊆ Frag(A) and N 6⊢ICK
B for some LCK formula B; observe that it is not assumed that B ∈
Frag(A). Then there exists an A-prime set P such that N ⊆ P and P 6⊢ICK
B.
Proof. Let A0, . . . , Ak be an enumeration of the elements of Frag(A). Now
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we deﬁne by induction, for n = 0, . . . , k,
N0 := N,
Nn+1 :=
{
Nn ∪ {An} if Nn ∪ {An} 6 ⊢ICK B,
Nn if Nn ∪ {An} ⊢ICK B.
Clearly, we have N ⊆ Nn ⊆ Nn+1 and Nn+1 6⊢ICK B for n = 0, . . . , k. We
set P := Nk+1 and show that P is A-prime. The reasoning is exactly the
same as in the proof of the prime lemma for IK.
As for prime sets of formulas, in this section we let P,Q,R (possibly
with subscripts) range over A-prime sets of LCK formulas. In addition, we
set
P c := Frag(A) \ P.
Definition 3.28 (Canonical model for ICK). Depending on the given
LCK formula A we now deﬁne the structure
M(A) := (WA,⊆,RA1 , . . . ,R
A
ℓ ,V
A)
where
(C.1) WA := {P ⊆ Frag(A) | P is A-prime}.
(C.2) For any i = 1, . . . , ℓ, RAi is deﬁned to be the binary relation on W
A
deﬁned as
P RAi Q :⇐⇒ ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q
(C.3) VA :WA → P(Prop) is the function given by
VA(Q) := {p ∈ Prop | p ∈ Q}.
We immediately observe that M(A) is an EK-structure. The following
lemma is the core of the completeness proof.
Lemma 3.29 (Truth lemma). We have for all formulas B ∈ Frag(A) and
all P ∈ WA that
B ∈ P ⇐⇒ (M(A), P )  B.
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Proof. It is clear that we can assign a rank to each LCK formula such that
the rank of the logical constant ⊥ and of every atomic proposition is 0,
the rank of a subformula C0 of a formula C is smaller than that of C,
and the rank of a formula ✷iC is smaller than that of C(C). We establish
the equivalence of the truth lemma by induction on the rank of B and
distinguish the following cases.
(i) It trivially holds in case that B is an atomic proposition or the logical
constant ⊥.
(ii) If B is a disjunction or a conjunction it follows from the induction
hypothesis and the properties of A-prime sets. The reasoning is the same
as for IK.
(iii) B is the implication C1 → C2. Again we proceed similarly to the
situation for IK. We ﬁrst assume that
C1 → C2 ∈ P, P ⊆ Q, and Q  C1.
Then we have C1 → C2 ∈ Q and (by the induction hypothesis) C1 ∈ Q.
Since Q is deductively closed with respect to Frag(A) this yields C2 ∈ Q
and thus again by the induction hypothesis that Q  C2. Since Q has been
an arbitrary A-prime superset of P , we conclude P  C1 → C2.
Now assume P  C1 → C2 and C1 → C2 /∈ P . Since P is deductively
closed with respect to Frag(A), we have P ∪ {C1} 6 ⊢ICK C2. By the prime
lemma there exists a Q such that
P ∪ {C1} ⊆ Q and Q 6⊢ICK C2.
Together with the induction hypothesis we thus obtain
Q  C1 and Q 2 C2.
Since P ⊆ Q, this contradicts P  C1 → C2.
(iv) B is a formula ✷iC. For the direction from left to right assume
✷iC ∈ P and ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q
for an arbitrary Q. This implies C ∈ Q, and in view of the induction
hypothesis we thus have Q  C. Therefore, P  ✷iC.
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For the converse direction we assume P  ✷iC. We ﬁrst claim that
✷
−1
i P ⊢ICK C. (3.1)
To establish this claim, assume for contradiction that ✷−1i P 6⊢ICK C. Ac-
cording to the prime lemma we thus have a Q such that ✷−1i P ⊆ Q and
Q 6⊢ICK C. In particular, C /∈ Q. By the induction hypothesis, this yields
Q 2 C; a contradiction to P  ✷iC and ✷
−1
i P ⊆ Q.
From (1) we conclude that there are A1, . . . , An ∈ ✷
−1
i P with
⊢ICK A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → C.
By using necessitation we get
⊢ICK ✷i(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → C)
and with the K-axiom and propositional reasoning we obtain
⊢ICK ✷iA1 ∧ · · · ∧✷iAn → ✷iC
with ✷iA1, . . . ,✷iAn ∈ P , implying that P ⊢ICK ✷iC. Hence ✷iC ∈ P
since P is deductively closed with respect to Frag(A).
(v) B is a formula C(C). We ﬁrst assume C(C) ∈ P and check by
simple induction on n that for all natural numbers n ≥ 1 and all Q ∈
ReachM(A)(P, n),
C ∈ Q and C(C) ∈ Q. (3.2)
Hence we have C ∈ Q for all Q ∈ ReachM(A)(P ) and by the induction
hypothesis Q  C for these sets Q. Therefore, P  C(C).
Now we assume P  C(C). To show that then C(C) ∈ P is the most
interesting part of this proof. We set
W := {Q ∈ WA | Q  C(C)} and S :=
∨({∧
Q
∣∣∣ Q ∈ W}) .
We brieﬂy pause to reﬂect on the formula S. Intuitively, a world Q ofW is
a situation where C(C) holds, and since such a Q is a ﬁnite set of formulas,
we can form the conjunction
∧
Q. This is a formula which completely
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describes this situation Q. Then, the disjunction S describes that we are in
one of the worlds ofW, so in a situation where C(C) holds. In the following,
we will show that our logic reﬂects that in the situation (described by) S,
everybody knows C and everbody knows S, more precisely:
⊢ICK S → E(C) ∧ E(S).
Then we will use the induction rule to derive ⊢ICK S → C(C) which leads
to C(C) ∈ P . We continue by proving a series of auxiliary assertions.
(I) For all P ∈ W : ⊢ICK
∧
P → ✷iC.
Proof of (I). For P ∈ W we have P  ✷iC and thus ✷iC ∈ P by the
induction hypothesis. The assertion follows immediately.
(II) For all P ∈ W and Q ∈ Ri[P ]: Q ∈ W.
Proof of (II). For P ∈ W we have P  ✷iC(C) and thus Q  C(C) for all
Q ∈ Ri[P ]. This is what we had to show.
(III) For all P ∈ W: ✷−1i P ⊢ICK S.
Proof of (III). Let P be an element of W and assume that ✷−1i P 6⊢ICK S.
By the prime lemma then there exists a Q such that ✷−1i P ⊆ Q and
Q 6⊢ICK S. Hence Q ∈ Ri[P ] and, in view of (II), Q ∈ W. This is a
contradiction to Q 6⊢ICK S.
(IV) For all P ∈ W: ⊢ICK
∧
P → ✷iS.
Proof of (IV). Because of (III) we know that there are A1, . . . , An ∈ ✷
−1
i P
such that
⊢ICK A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → S.
Thus we also have
⊢ICK ✷iA1 ∧ · · · ∧✷iAn → ✷iS
with ✷iA1, . . . ,✷iAn ∈ P . Hence P ⊢ICK ✷iS, and the assertion is an
immediate consequence.
From (I) and (IV) we obtain
⊢ICK
∧
P → E(C) ∧ E(S)
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for all P ∈ W, hence
⊢ICK S → E(C) ∧ E(S). (3.3)
By means of the induction rule we obtain from (3) that
⊢ICK S → C(C).
By assumption we have P ∈ W and thus P ⊢ICK S. Hence P ⊢ICK C(C)
and so C(C) ∈ P since P is deductively closed with respect to Frag(A).
This ﬁnishes the proof of the truth lemma.
With the truth lemma at our disposal, the proof of the completeness
of ICK is now routine.
Theorem 3.30 (Completeness of ICK). Suppose that A is an EK-valid
LCK formula. Then ⊢ICK A.
Proof. Assume that 6⊢ICK A. Then there exists an A-prime P such that
P 6⊢ICK A. Hence A /∈ P , and thus the truth lemma implies P 2 A.
However, then A is not valid in the canonical model M(A), contradicting
our assumption.
Now we turn to the completeness of ICKT. In principle, we proceed
as before: We start oﬀ from an LCK formula A, introduce the set Frag(A)
and build a canonical model. The only diﬀerence is that we work with
A-T-prime sets instead of A-prime sets. Here a set P of LCK formulas is
called A-T-prime iﬀ it has the properties (P.1), (P.3), (P.4) of A-prime sets
plus for all B the property
(P.2’) B ∈ Frag(A) and P ⊢ICKT B =⇒ B ∈ P .
Then we construct the canonical model as before, but with A-prime sets
replaced by A-T-prime sets; we call it
N(A) := (SA,⊆, SA1 , . . . , S
A
ℓ , U
A).
All we have to show in addition to what we did before is that N(A) is
reﬂexive. Hence take an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, an A-T-prime set P , and an
arbitrary element B of ✷−1i P . Then ✷iB ∈ P . Since
⊢ICKT ✷iB → B
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this implies B ∈ P . Hence ✷−1i P ⊆ P and thus P ∈ S
A
i [P ]. The truth
lemma for N(A) goes through as above, and the completeness of ICKT
with respect to reﬂexive EK-structures is an immediate consequence.
Theorem 3.31 (Completeness of ICKT). Suppose that the LCK formula
A is valid in all reflexive EK-structures. Then ⊢ICKT A.
3.4. Disjunction property
Typically, intuitionistic formalisms possess the disjunction property:
⊢ A ∨B =⇒ ⊢ A or ⊢ B
It is an immediate consequence of the previous soundness and completeness
results that the disjunction property also holds for ICK and ICKT.
Theorem 3.32 (Disjunction property). For all LCK formulas A and B
we have:
(a) If A ∨B is EK-valid, then A is EK-valid or B is EK-valid.
(b) If A ∨B is valid in all reflexive EK-structures, then A is valid in all
reflexive EK-structures or B is valid in all reflexive EK-structures.
(c) If ICK• is the system ICK or the system ICKT, then
⊢ICK• A ∨B =⇒ ⊢ICK• A or ⊢ICK• B.
Proof. In view of the soundness and completeness of ICK•, the third as-
sertion is an immediate consequence of the ﬁrst and the second. The proof
of the second is exactly as the proof of the ﬁrst, and to prove the ﬁrst, we
assume that neither A nor B are EK-valid. Then there exist EK-structures
M1 = (W1,≤1, R
(1)
1 , . . . , R
(1)
ℓ , V1) and M2 = (W2,≤2, R
(2)
1 , . . . , R
(2)
ℓ , V2)
together with w1 ∈W1 and w2 ∈W2 such that
(M1, w1) 2 A and (M2, w2) 2 B
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Now consider the structure M := (W,≤, R1, . . . , Rℓ, V ) whose universe is
the set
W := {(0, 0)} ∪ {(1, x) | x ∈W1} ∪ {(2, x) | x ∈W2}
and the preorder ≤ on W is deﬁned by
(x1, y1) ≤ (x2, y2) :⇔


x1 = 0 or
(x1 = x2 = 1 and y1 ≤1 y2) or
(x1 = x2 = 2 and y1 ≤2 y2).
Furthermore, for every i = 1, . . . , ℓ, Ri ⊆W ×W is given by
Ri[(x, y)] :=


W if x = 0,
{(1, z) | z ∈ R(1)i [y]} if x = 1,
{(2, z) | z ∈ R(2)i [y]} if x = 2.
Finally, V :W → P(Prop) is deﬁned by
V (x, y) :=


∅ if x = 0,
V1(y) if x = 1,
V2(y) if x = 2.
Obviously, M is an EK-structure. It is also easy to check that for all LCK
formulas C, all x ∈W1, and all y ∈W2,
(M, (1, x))  C ⇐⇒ (M1, x)  C
(M, (2, y))  C ⇐⇒ (M2, y)  C.
Because of (*) this implies that
(M, (1, w1)) 2 A and (M, (2, w2)) 2 B
The monotonicity of M with respect to ≤, cf. Lemma 3.6, and the fact that
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(0, 0) ≤ (1, w1) and (0, 0) ≤ (2, w2) thus yield
(M, (0, 0)) 2 A and (M, (0, 0)) 2 B.
implying that
(M, (0, 0)) 2 A ∨B.
From this we conclude that A ∨B is not EK-valid.
It is also fairly easy to extend the results of this article to semantics
and deductive systems that reﬂect positive introspection, like IS4; details
are left to the reader. Negative introspection, on the other hand, is a
diﬀerent matter. Typically, intuitionistic S5 is formulated by making use
of the box and the diamond operator; see, e.g., Fischer Servi [Fis84] and
Simpson [Sim94] and in intuitionistic modal logic ✸A is not equivalent
to ¬✷¬A. It is planned for the future to look at negative introspection
from an intuitionistic perspective and to analyze the emerging issues from
a technical and conceptual perspective.
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Intuitionistic Justification
Logic
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3.5. Introduction
Justiﬁcation logics extend propositional logics with formulas of the form
t : A, meaning that t is a justiﬁcation, a piece of evidence, or a proof of A, or
that A is known for the reason t. Intuitionistic justiﬁcation logic consists
of the usual machinery of justiﬁcation logic, but based on intuitionistic
propositional logic instead of classical propositional logic. It was introduced
by Artemov in [Art98].
As reported in Gettier [Get63], Plato (see also [Cha13]) already seemed
to have considered three criteria for knowledge : belief, truth and justiﬁca-
tion. To know something, so is the idea, one has to believe it, it has to be
true, and in addition one needs to have a justiﬁcation for it. The rationale
for the justiﬁcation condition goes roughly as follows: If someone comes to
believe A and just by pure luck, A is actually true, then he does not have
knowledge of A, but only true belief. There is something lacking, namely
him having a justiﬁcation for believing A.
Some formal counterparts of the concepts of belief and truth have their
role in epistemic logic based on modal logic: The ✷-modality can be seen
as expressing belief, and the truth axiom ✷A → A expresses the factivity
of these beliefs. Whereas some formal counterparts of the concepts of
belief and truth play a role in epistemic logic based on modal logic, there
is no explicit formal counterpart of th concept of justiﬁcation in these
frameworks.
Epistemic logic based on modal logic treats knowledge via universal
quantiﬁcation: An agent knows a proposition iﬀ it is true in all worlds
accessible to the agent. Justiﬁcation logic adds an aspect of existential
quantiﬁcation to epistemic logics: An agent knows a proposition if he has
a justiﬁcation for it, in other words if there exists a justiﬁcation available
to him.
The ﬁrst justiﬁcation logic was called the Logic of Proofs, and a special
case of justiﬁcation is when we consider all justiﬁcations to be mathematical
proofs in a speciﬁc proof system.
There is a very close connection between some justiﬁcation logics and
some modal logics. The so-called forgetful projection maps formulas of
justiﬁcation logic to formulas of modal logic by replacing all justiﬁcation
terms with ✷ and therefore embeds the justiﬁcation logic into the modal
logic. On the other hand, there are techniques of realization which replaces
all boxes by appropriate justiﬁcation terms, and therefore embedding a
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justiﬁcation logic into a modal logic. This is more involved, and there exist
several approaches to realization, from semantic arguments to algorithmic
ones. Given realization, we can view justiﬁcation logic as as a kind of more
explicit modal logic.
Justiﬁcation logics have found many applications. Artemov has used
them to give a provability interpretation of S4 [Art95, Art01], modeling
epistemic paradoxes like Gettier cases, the Red Barn Example of Goldman
and Kripke, and Russel’s example of induced factivity [Art08a]. Artemov
and Kuznets used justiﬁcation logic to address the problem of logical om-
niscience [AK06a], and it has found applications to protocol-veriﬁcation
[Stu11a] and data privacy [Stu11b].
In this thesis, we will only treat single-agent systems of justiﬁcation
logic, and t : A can then be read as “the agent has the justiﬁcation t for A”.
There are also multi-agent versions of justiﬁcation logics, where we instead
have formulas of the form t :i A, meaning that the agent i has justiﬁcation
t for A. Also, there are approaches for connecting some justiﬁcation log-
ics with distributed [Gha10] and with common knowledge [Art06, BKS11].
Moreover, there are dynamic epistemic justiﬁcation logics [KS13] and prob-
abilistic justiﬁcation logics [KMOS15] available.
The original part of this chapter is the completeness proof with respect
to basic modular models, which is based on [MS16].
3.6. A sequent system for IS4
We shortly come back to intuitionistic modal logic. For connecting our
justiﬁcation logic with the single-agent version of IS4 via realization, we
will need a cut-free sequent system of the single-agent versions of IS4,
which we call GIS4.
Definition 3.33 (The proof system GIS4). A sequent is an expression
of the form Γ ⊃ A, where Γ is a ﬁnite multiset of formulas and A is a
formula. The Gentzen-style system GIS4 derives sequents of the language
LK (where ℓ = 1) and consists of the following axioms and rules:
Γ ⊃ A if A ∈ Γ or ⊥ ∈ Γ
Γ, A ⊃ C Γ, B ⊃ C
(∨ ⊃)
Γ, A ∨B ⊃ C
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Γ ⊃ A (⊃ ∨)1Γ ⊃ A ∨B
Γ ⊃ B (⊃ ∨)2Γ ⊃ A ∨B
Γ, A,B ⊃ C
(∧ ⊃)
Γ, A ∧B ⊃ C
Γ ⊃ A Γ ⊃ B (⊃ ∧)
Γ ⊃ A ∧B
Γ ⊃ A Γ, B ⊃ C
(→⊃)
Γ, A→ B ⊃ C
Γ, A ⊃ B
(⊃→)
Γ ⊃ A→ B
A,Γ ⊃ B
(✷ ⊃)
✷A,Γ ⊃ B
✷Γ ⊃ A (⊃ ✷)
✷Γ ⊃ ✷A
Γ ⊃ A (weakening)
Γ,∆ ⊃ A
Γ, A,A ⊃ B
(contraction)
Γ, A ⊃ B
In the rule (⊃ ✷), the expression ✷Γ denotes the multiset {✷A | A ∈
Γ}. As usual, we say that a formula A is provable in GIS4, in symbols
⊢GIS4 A, if the sequent ⊃ A is provable.
In the following, we will use Γ,∆ (possibly with subscripts) exclusively
for ﬁnite multisets of formulas.
Theorem 3.34. GIS4 is sound and complete with respect to single-agent
reflexive transitive EK-structures.
Proof. Soundness and completeness follow from [Ono77, Theorem 3.2 on
p. 696] and the observation that Ono’s I-models of type 0 are the same as
our single-agent reﬂexive transitive EK-structures.
Using soundness 1.12 and completeness 1.22 of IS4 the equivalence of
IS4 and GIS4 follows immediately.
Corollary 3.35. The Hilbert system IS4 and the sequent system GIS4
are equivalent, i.e. for each LK -formula A we have
⊢IS4 A ⇐⇒ ⊢GIS4 A
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Definition 3.36 (Justiﬁcation terms). We assume a countable set of jus-
tiﬁcation constants and a countable set of justiﬁcation variables. The set
of justification terms (or just terms) Tm is inductively deﬁned by:
(a) each justiﬁcation constant and each justiﬁcation variable is a justiﬁ-
cation term;
(b) if s and t are justiﬁcation terms, then so are
• (s · t), read s dot t,
• (s+ t), read s plus t,
• !s, read bang s.
Definition 3.37 (Formulas). We start with the same set Prop of atomic
propositions as in LK . The set of formulas LJ is inductively deﬁned by:
(a) every atomic proposition is a formula;
(b) the constant symbol ⊥ is a formula;
(c) If A and B are formulas, then (A ∧ B), (A ∨ B) and (A → B) are
formulas;
(d) if A is a formula and t a term, then t : A is a formula.
Definition 3.38. The system iJT4 has the following axioms:
(a) all axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic
(b) t : (A→ B)→ (s : A→ t · s : B)
(c) t : A→ t+ s : A and s : A→ t+ s : A
(d) t : A→ A
(e) t : A→ !t : t : A
A constant specification CS is any subset
CS ⊆ {(c, A) | c is a constant and A is an axiom of iJT4}.
A constant speciﬁcation CS is called:
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• axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom A of iJT4, there is a
constant c such that (c, A) ∈ CS.
• schematic if for each constant c, the set of axioms {A | (c, A) ∈ CS}
consists of all instances of several (possibly zero) axiom schemes of
iJT4.
For a constant speciﬁcation CS the deductive system iJT4CS is the
Hilbert system given by the axioms above and by the rules modus ponens
and axiom necessitation:
A→ B A (MP)
B
(c, A) ∈ CS
(AN)
c : A
Remark 3.39. Although axiom necessitation is a rule without premises, it
is important to consider it as a rule and not as an axiom schema. If we said
that c : A is an axiom for each (c, A) ∈ CS, then the notion of an axiom
would depend on the constant speciﬁcation, which in turn would depend
on the notion of an axiom. Since we want to avoid this circularity, axiom
necessitation is introduced as a rule.
Remark 3.40. Let Tot be the total constant speciﬁcation, i.e.
Tot := {(c, A) | c is a constant and A is an axiom of iJT4}.
Artemov’s [Art02] intuitionistic logic of proofs ILP is then the same as
our iJT4Tot.
As for our intuitionistic modal logics, we have the deduction theorem
for intuitionistic justiﬁcation logic.
Theorem 3.41 (Deduction Theorem). For every set of formulas M and
all formulas A,B we have that
M ∪ {A} ⊢iJT4CS B ⇐⇒ M ⊢iJT4CS A→ B.
As usual in justiﬁcation logic, we can establish the Lifting Lemma.
Lemma 3.42 (Lifting Lemma). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate
constant specification. For arbitrary formulas A,B1, . . . , Bm, C1, . . . , Cn
and arbitrary justification terms r1, . . . , rm, s1, . . . , sn, if
r1 : B1, . . . , rm : Bm, C1, . . . , Cn ⊢iJT4CS A,
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then there is a justification term t such that
r1 : B1, . . . , rm : Bm, s1 : C1, . . . , sn : Cn ⊢iJT4CS t : A.
Definition 3.43 (Substitution). A substitution is a mapping from justi-
ﬁcation variables to justiﬁcation terms. Given a substitution σ and an
LJ-formula A, the formula Aσ is obtained from A by simultaneously re-
placing all occurrences of x with σ(x) in A for all justiﬁcation variables
x.
As usual in justiﬁcation logic, we have the following substitution prop-
erty for schematic constant speciﬁcations.
Lemma 3.44 (Substitution Property). Let CS be a schematic constant
specification. We have for any LJ-formula A and any substitution σ
B1, . . . , Bn ⊢iJT4CS A implies B1σ, . . . , Bnσ ⊢iJT4CS Aσ.
We ﬁnd that iJT4CS is a conservative extension of intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic. Hence iJT4CS is consistent.
Lemma 3.45 (Conservativity). iJT4CS is a conservative extension of in-
tuitionistic propositional logic Int, i.e., for any formula A of intuitionistic
propositional logic,
⊢iJT4CS A iff ⊢Int A.
Proof. The implication from right to left is trivial. For the other direction
consider the mapping (·)s from LJ to formulas of intuitionistic propositional
logic given by:
⊥s := ⊥ ps := p
(A ∧B)s := As ∧Bs (A ∨B)s := As ∨Bs
(A→ B)s := As → Bs (t : B)s := Bs
For any formula C of LJ, we can show
⊢iJT4CS C implies ⊢Int C
s
by induction on the length of the iJT4CS-derivation. Thus the claim im-
mediately follows from As = A.
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Lemma 3.46 (Consistency of iJT4CS). For any constant specification CS,
the logic iJT4CS is consistent.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that iJT4CS were not consistent,
that means ⊢iJT4CS ⊥. By the conservativity of iJT4CS over propositional
intuitionistic logic Int (previous lemma), it would then follow that ⊢Int ⊥,
which is not the case.
3.7. Basic Modular Models
Basic modular models are syntactic models for justiﬁcation logic. Yet,
our basic modular models will include possible worlds in order to deal
with the intuitionistic base logic. After deﬁning basic modular models for
intuitionistic justiﬁcation logic, we will prove soundness and completeness.
In this and the next section, derivability always refers to derivability
in iJT4CS. Accordingly we use ⊢ to mean ⊢iJT4CS .
For two sets of formulas M,N and a term s we write
M ·N := {A | B → A ∈M and B ∈ N for some formula B}
s :M := {s : A | A ∈M}
Definition 3.47 (Basic evaluation). A basic evaluation is a tuple (W,≤, ∗)
where
W 6= ∅ and ≤ is a partial order on W,
∗ : Prop×W → {0, 1} ∗ : Tm×W → P(LJ)
(where we often write t∗w for ∗(t, w) and p
∗
w for ∗(p, w)), such that for
arbitrary s, t ∈ Tm, any formula A, and every w ∈W ,
(1) s∗w · t
∗
w ⊆ (s · t)
∗
w;
(2) s∗w ∪ t
∗
w ⊆ (s+ t)
∗
w;
(3) (t, A) ∈ CS =⇒ A ∈ t∗w;
(4) s : s∗w ⊆ (!s)
∗
w.
Furthermore, it has to satisfy the following monotonicity conditions:
(M.1) p∗w = 1 and w ≤ v =⇒ p
∗
v = 1;
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(M.2) w ≤ v =⇒ t∗w ⊆ t
∗
v.
Strictly speaking we should use the notion of a CS basic evaluation
because condition (3) depends on a given CS. However, the constant spec-
iﬁcation will always be clear from the context and we can safely omit it.
The same also holds for modular models (to be introduced later).
Definition 3.48 (Truth under basic evaluation). Let M = (W,≤, ∗) be a
basic evaluation. For w ∈ W , we deﬁne (M, w)  A by induction on the
formula A as follows:
• (M, w) 2 ⊥;
• (M, w)  p iﬀ p∗w = 1;
• (M, w)  A ∧B iﬀ (M, w)  A and (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A ∨B iﬀ (M, w)  A or (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A→ B iﬀ (M, v)  B for all v ≥ w with (M, v)  A;
• (M, w)  t : A iﬀ A ∈ t∗w.
We immediately obtain the monotonicity property for intuitionistic
justiﬁcation logic.
Lemma 3.49 (Monotonicity). For any basic evaluation M = (W,≤, ∗),
any w, v ∈W , and any formula A:
(M, w)  A and w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  A.
Definition 3.50 (Factive evaluation). A basic evaluation M = (W,≤, ∗)
is called factive iﬀ
A ∈ t∗w =⇒ (M, w)  A
for all formulas A, all justiﬁcation terms t and all states w ∈W .
Definition 3.51 (Basic modular model). A basic modular model is a basic
evaluation (W,≤, ∗) that is factive.
We say that a formula A is valid with respect to basic modular models
if for all basic modular models M = (W,≤, ∗) and all w ∈ W we have
(M, w)  A.
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Lemma 3.52 (Soundness of iJT4CS with respect to basic modular mod-
els). For every formula A:
⊢ A implies A is valid with respect to basic modular models.
In order to show completeness, we need some auxiliary deﬁnitions and
lemmas.
As for intuitionistic modal logic, we need a lemma about provability
from disjunctions and then a version of the prime lemma for intuitionistic
justiﬁcation logics. The proofs of these statements are very similar to those
for modal logic: We only use properties of prime sets and propositional
reasoning.
Lemma 3.53 (Disjunction Lemma). Let N be an arbitrary set of formulas
and let A,B and C be formulas. If
N ∪ {A} ⊢ C and N ∪ {B} ⊢ C, then N ∪ {A ∨B} ⊢ C.
Theorem 3.54 (Prime Lemma). Let B be a formula and let N be a set
of formulas such that N 0 B. Then there exists a prime set P with N ⊆ P
and P 0 B.
Lemma 3.55. Let P be a prime set and t be a justification term. Then
t−1P := {A | t : A ∈ P} ⊆ P.
Proof. Let A ∈ t−1P . Then t : A ∈ P . Since P is deductively closed, it
contains all axioms, thus t : A → A ∈ P . Again, since P is deductively
closed, it follows by (MP) that A ∈ P .
Definition 3.56 (Canonical basic modular model). The canonical basic
modular model is the structure
B := (W,⊆,⋆)
where
(i) W := {P | P is prime}
(ii) ⋆(p, P ) = 1 iﬀ p ∈ P
(iii) ⋆(t, P ) := t−1P
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Lemma 3.57. B is a basic evaluation.
Proof. W 6= ∅: By the consistency of iJT4CS we have that ∅ 0 ⊥, it
follows by the Prime Lemma 3.54 that there exists a prime set, so W 6= ∅.
Next, we check the conditions on the sets of formulas t⋆P .
(1) s⋆P · t
⋆
P ⊆ (s · t)
⋆
P . Let A ∈ s
⋆
P · t
⋆
P . Then there is a formula B ∈ t
⋆
P
such that B → A ∈ s⋆P . So s : B → A ∈ P and t : B ∈ P . Since P is
a prime set, it is deductively closed, so it contains the axiom
s : (B → A)→ (t : B → s · t : A).
Again since P is deductively closed, it follows by (MP) that s · t : A ∈
P , so A ∈ (s · t)−1P = (s · t)⋆P .
(2) s⋆P ∪ t
⋆
P ⊆ (s+ t)
⋆
P . Let A ∈ s
⋆
P ∪ t
⋆
P . Case 1: A ∈ s
⋆
P = s
−1P . Then
s : A ∈ P . Since P is deductively closed, it contains the axiom
s : A→ (s+ t) : A.
Thus by (MP) we ﬁnd (s+ t) : A ∈ P , i.e., A ∈ (s+ t)−1P = (s+ t)⋆P .
The second case is analogous.
(3) (t, A) ∈ CS =⇒ A ∈ t⋆P . By axiom necessitation we ﬁnd that
⊢ t : A, so P ⊢ t : A. Since P is deductively closed, it follows that
t : A ∈ P , so A ∈ t−1P = t⋆P .
(4) s : s⋆P ⊆ (!s)
⋆
P . Let A ∈ s : s
⋆
P . Then A is of the form s : B for
some formula B ∈ s⋆P = s
−1P , i.e., s : B ∈ P . We ﬁnd that the
axiom (s : B) → !s : (s : B) ∈ P , so !s : (s : B) ∈ P , which means
s : B ∈ (!s)−1P = (!s)⋆P .
Now we check the monotonicity conditions.
(M.1) Assume that p⋆P = 1 and P ⊆ Q. By the deﬁnition of ⋆ we have
that p ∈ P , so p ∈ Q hence p⋆Q = 1.
(M.2) Now assume that P ⊆ Q. Then t−1P ⊆ t−1Q, which is t⋆P ⊆ t
⋆
Q .
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Lemma 3.58 (Truth Lemma). For any formula A and any prime set P :
A ∈ P ⇐⇒ (B, P )  A.
Proof. By induction on the formula A. We distinguish the following cases.
(a) A = p or A = ⊥. By deﬁnition.
(b) A = B ∧ C. Assume that B ∧ C ∈ P . Since P is deductively closed,
we have B ∈ P and C ∈ P , so it follows by the induction hypothesis
that (B, P )  B and (B, P )  C, hence (B, P )  B ∧ C.
For the other direction assume that (B, P )  B ∧ C, so (B, P )  B
and (B, P )  C. By the induction hypothesis, we get that B ∈ P
and C ∈ P . Since P is deductively closed, it follows that B ∧C ∈ P .
(c) A = B ∨ C. Assume that B ∨ C ∈ P . Since P has the disjunc-
tion property, it follows that B ∈ P or C ∈ P , so by the induction
hypothesis, (B, P )  B or (B, P )  C, so (B, P )  B ∨ C.
For the other direction assume that (B, P )  B ∨ C. Then
(B, P )  B or (B, P )  C,
so by the induction hypothesis, B ∈ P or C ∈ P . Since P is deduc-
tively closed, it follows that B ∨ C ∈ P .
(d) A = B → C. Assume that B → C ∈ P . We have to show (B, P ) 
B → C, so let Q be a prime set such that P ⊆ Q and (B, Q)  B. It
follows by the induction hypothesis that B ∈ Q, and since B → C ∈
Q and Q is deductively closed, we have that C ∈ Q. Applying the
induction hypothesis again, we get that (B, Q)  C.
For the other direction assume that (B, P )  B → C. We have to
show that B → C ∈ P . Assume for a contradiction that B → C /∈ P .
Since P is deductively closed, it follows that P 0 B → C. It follows
by the Deduction Theorem 3.41 that P ∪ {B} 0 C. By the Prime
Lemma 3.54, there is a prime set Q such that P ∪ {B} ⊆ Q and
Q 0 C, so in particular, C /∈ Q. By the induction hypothesis it follows
that (B, Q)  B and (B, Q) 2 C, contradicting our assumption that
(B, P )  B → C.
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(e) A = t : B. We have
t : B ∈ P ⇐⇒ B ∈ t−1P =⋆(t, P ) ⇐⇒ (B, P )  t : B.
Lemma 3.59. B is a basic modular model.
Proof. We only have to show factivity, for which we use the Truth Lemma.
Assume that
A ∈⋆(t, P ) = t−1P.
By Lemma 3.55 we know that t−1P ⊆ P , so we have A ∈ P . By the
Truth Lemma for the canonical basic modular model, we can conclude
that (B, P )  A. So factivity is shown.
Theorem 3.60 (Completeness of iJT4CS with respect to basic modular
models). For any formula A:
A is valid with respect to basic modular models implies ⊢ A.
Proof. By contraposition. Assume that 0 A. By the Prime Lemma 3.54,
there exists a prime set P such that P 0 A. In particular, A /∈ P . By the
Truth Lemma 3.58, it follows that
(B, P ) 2 A.
Since this structure is a basic modular model, it follows that A is not valid
with respect to basic modular models.
3.8. Modular Models
In this section, we introduce modular models for intuitionistic justiﬁcation
logic. Modular models are epistemic models in the sense that they feature
possible worlds to model the notion of knowledge. The main principle of
these logics is called justification yields belief, which means that if there is a
justiﬁcation for a formula A, then that formula must hold in all accessible
worlds.
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Modular models may seem too expressive as our language does not
include a ✷-operator. However, these models explain the connection be-
tween implicit and explicit notions of belief. The main feature of modular
models is that they provide a clear ontological separation of justiﬁcation
and truth, see, e.g., [Art12, KS12].
In the second part of this section, we study so-called fully explanatory
modular models. These models additionally require that if a formula holds
in all accessible worlds, then there must be a justiﬁcation for that formula.
This principle can be seen as the reverse direction of justiﬁcation yields
belief.
Definition 3.61 (Quasimodels). A quasimodel is a tuple
M = (W,≤, R, ∗),
such that (W,≤, ∗) is a basic evaluation, and R is a binary relation on W .
Definition 3.62 (Truth in quasimodels). We deﬁne what it means for a
formula A to hold at a world w ∈ W of a quasimodel M = (W,≤ R, ∗),
written (M, w)  A, inductively as follows:
• (M, w) 2 ⊥;
• (M, w)  p iﬀ p∗w = 1;
• (M, w)  A ∧B iﬀ (M, w)  A and (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A ∨B iﬀ (M, w)  A or (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A→ B iﬀ (M, v)  B for all v ≥ w with (M, v)  A;
• (M, w)  t : A iﬀ A ∈ t∗w.
Further we deﬁne ✷w := {A ∈ LJ | (M, v)  A for all v ∈ R[w]}.
Lemma 3.63 (Locality of truth in quasimodels). Let B = (W,≤, ∗) be a
basic evaluation and M = (W,≤, R, ∗) be a quasimodel. We find that for
each w ∈W and each formula A,
(M, w)  A ⇐⇒ (B, w)  A.
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Definition 3.64 (Factive quasimodel). A quasimodel M = (W,≤, R, ∗) is
called factive if A ∈ t∗w implies (M, w)  A for all w ∈ W, t ∈ Tm, and
formulas A.
Definition 3.65 (Modular models). A quasimodel M = (W,≤ R, ∗) is
called a modular model if it meets the following conditions:
(1) t∗w ⊆ ✷w for all t ∈ Tm and w ∈W (JYB);
(2) R is reﬂexive;
(3) R is transitive;
(4) w ≤ v =⇒ R[v] ⊆ R[w] (Compatibility of ≤ with R).
We say that a formula A is valid with respect to modular models if for each
modular model M = (W,≤ R, ∗) and all w ∈W we have (M, w)  A.
The abbreviation JYB stands for justification yields belief, which is
the main principle of modular models. This notion goes back to Arte-
mov [Art12].
Lemma 3.66 (Modular models are factive). All modular models are fac-
tive.
Proof. Whenever A ∈ t∗w for some formula A, some t ∈ Tm, and some
w ∈ W , we have A ∈ ✷w by JYB. Since R(w,w) by the reﬂexivity of R,
we obtain (M, w)  A from the deﬁnition of ✷w.
Corollary 3.67 (Factivity of basic evaluations used in modular models).
For any modular model M = (W,≤, R, ∗) we have that the basic evaluation
B := (W,≤, ∗) is factive and, hence, a basic modular model.
Proof. Assume that for the basic evaluation (W,≤, ∗) , we have A ∈ t∗w
for some formula A, some point w ∈ W and some term t ∈ Tm. Then
A ∈ t∗w in the modular model notation. By the previous lemma, we get
(M, w)  A, from which we conclude (B, w)  A by Lemma 3.63.
Lemma 3.68 (Justiﬁcations remain relevant). Let M = (W,≤, R, ∗) be
a modular model. Then for any t ∈ Tm and for arbitrary w, v ∈ W , if
R(w, v), then t∗w ⊆ t
∗
v , i.e., justifications remain relevant in accessible
worlds.
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Proof. Assume R(w, v) and A ∈ t∗w for some formula A. Then we have
t : A ∈ (!t)∗w because (W,≤, ∗) is a basic evaluation. Therefore, t : A ∈ ✷w
by JYB and, in particular, (M, v)  t : A by the deﬁnition of ✷w, which
means that A ∈ t∗v .
Theorem 3.69 (Soundness and completeness: modular models). For any
constant specification CS and any formula A we have
⊢ A ⇐⇒ A is valid with respect to modular models.
Proof. Soundness. Let M = (W,≤, R, ∗) be a modular model. We need
to show that any formula A such that ⊢ A holds at any world w ∈ W .
By Corollary 3.67, we know that B := (W,≤, ∗) is a basic modular model.
By soundness of iJT4CS with respect to basic modular models, we get
(B, w)  A. Hence, (M, w)  A by the locality of truth in quasimodels
(Lemma 3.63).
Completeness. For the opposite direction, suppose 0 A . By complete-
ness of iJT4CS with respect to basic modular models, there exists a basic
modular model B = (W,≤, ∗) and a world w ∈ W such that (B, w) 2 A.
We deﬁne a quasimodel M := (W,≤, R, ∗) with R :=≤. By locality of
truth for quasimodels (Lemma 3.63), we have that (M, w) 2 A, and it
only remains to show that M is a modular iJT4CS-model, i.e., that all
the restrictions on R and the condition JYB are met. The reﬂexivity and
transitivity of R are trivial. We check condition (4) (Compatibility of ≤
with R), i.e., w ≤ v =⇒ R[v] ⊆ R[w]. Assume w ≤ v and u ∈ R[v]. This
means that v ≤ u, so by transitivity of ≤ we have w ≤ u which means that
u ∈ R[w]. Let us ﬁnish the proof by demonstrating JYB. Assume that
A ∈ t∗w and R(w, v). From this we get that (B, w)  t : A and w ≤ v. By
monotonicity for basic modular models, it follows that (B, v)  t : A, so
A ∈ t∗v. By the factivity of basic modular models, we get that (B, v)  A,
and by the locality of truth in quasimodels, (M, v)  A. Since v was
arbitrary, we conclude that A ∈ ✷w.
Definition 3.70 (Fully explanatory modular models). A modular model
M = (W,≤, R, ∗) is fully explanatory if for any w ∈W ,
✷w ⊆
⋃
t∈Tm
t∗w,
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i.e., A ∈ ✷w implies A ∈ t∗w for some t ∈ Tm.
We need the following auxiliary deﬁnition.
Definition 3.71. M/♯ := {A ∈ LJ | t : A ∈M for some t ∈ Tm}.
Lemma 3.72.
M ⊆ N =⇒ M/♯ ⊆ N/♯
Proof. Assume that M ⊆ N and let A ∈ M/♯. By deﬁnition, there exists
a term t, such that t : A ∈M , so t : A ∈ N and A ∈ N/♯.
Lemma 3.73 (Soundness and completeness: fully explanatory modular
models). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification.
Then iJT4CS is sound and complete with respect to fully explanatory mod-
ular models.
Proof. Soundness immediately follows from soundness with respect to all
modular models (and holds independently of whether CS is axiomatically
appropriate).
We deﬁne the canonical modular model as
C := (W,⊆,R,⋆)
where
(i) W := {P | P is prime}
(ii) ⋆(p, P ) = 1 iﬀ p ∈ P
(iii) ⋆(t, P ) := t−1P
(iv) P R Q iﬀ P/♯ ⊆ Q
To show that C is a modular iJT4CS-model, it remains to establish
that the set W is non-empty, that R is reﬂexive and transitive, that ⊆ is
compatible with R and that the condition JYB is satisﬁed. We start with
showing W 6= ∅. We have already shown that the empty set is iJT4CS-
consistent, so by the Prime Lemma 3.54, there exists a prime set extending
∅, which is an element of W.
To show that ⊆ is compatible with R, assume that P ⊆ Q. We need
to show that R[Q] ⊆ R[P ], so we pick R ∈ R[Q] and show that R ∈ R[P ].
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R ∈ R[Q] means that Q/♯ ⊆ R. By the lemma above, we have that
P/♯ ⊆ Q/♯, and therefore P/♯ ⊆ R, i.e., R ∈ R[P ].
To show JYB, assume A ∈ t⋆P for some formula A , some t ∈ Tm,
and some P ∈ W . We need to show that A ∈ ✷P , i.e., that (C, Q)  A
whenever R(P,Q). Consider any such Q ∈ W. We have t : A ∈ P by the
deﬁnition of t⋆P and A ∈ Q by the deﬁnition of R . By the truth lemma
for basic evaluations, it follows that (B, Q)  A where B = (W,⊆,⋆). By
the locality of truth in quasimodels, we have (C, Q)  A.
To show that R is reﬂexive, consider any P ∈ W. Assume that A ∈
P/♯, i.e., that t : A ∈ P for some t ∈ Tm. Since P is prime, it is deductively
closed. t : A → A is an axiom, so t : A → A ∈ P . Again, since P is
deductively closed, it follows by (MP) that A ∈ P . Therefore, P/♯ ⊆ P ,
which means that R(P, P ).
To show that R is transitive, consider arbitrary P,Q,R ∈ W such
that R(P,Q) and R(Q,R). Assume that A ∈ P/♯, i.e., that t : A ∈ P
for some t ∈ Tm. Since P is prime, it is deductively closed, and since
t : A→ !t : t : A is an axiom of iJT4CS, we conclude !t : t : A ∈ P . Hence
t : A ∈ P/♯ ⊆ Q and A ∈ Q/♯ ⊆ R. Therefore, P/♯ ⊆ R, which means
R(P,Q).
Finally, we show that C is fully explanatory. Assume that A ∈ ✷P for
some formula A and prime set P . Then
P/♯ ⊢ A (3.4)
Indeed, assume for a contradiction that P/♯ 0 A. By the Prime Lemma,
there exists a prime set Q such that P/♯ ⊆ Q and Q 0 A. By the deﬁnition
of R, we have R(P,Q), and from Q 0 A we get that A /∈ Q. By the Truth
Lemma for basic evaluations, it follows that (B, Q) 2 A. By the locality
of truth in quasimodels, we have (C, Q) 2 A, contradicting our assumption
that A ∈ ✷P . By (3.4), it follows that there are ﬁnitely many formulas
B1, . . . , Bn ∈ P/♯, such that
B1, . . . , Bn ⊢ A.
Since each Bi ∈ P/♯ , there must exist terms si ∈ Tm such that si : Bi ∈ P
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
By the Lifting Lemma 3.42, given the axiomatic appropriateness of
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CS, there exists a term t such that
s1 : B1, . . . , sn : Bn ⊢ t : A
By the Deduction Theorem
⊢ s1 : B1 → (s2 : B2 → · · · → (sn : Bn → t : A) · · · ).
P is prime, so it is deductively closed, and therefore t : A ∈ P and ﬁnally
A ∈ t−1P = t⋆P .
So C is fully explanatory.
3.9. Realization
We establish in this section that the justiﬁcation logic iJT4 is the explicit
counterpart of the intuitionistic modal logic IS4. This is simply a reformu-
lation of [Art02, Section 3] using axiomatically appropriate and schematic
constant speciﬁcations.
First we show that IS4 is the forgetful projection of iJT4. We need
the following deﬁnition: if A is a formula of LJ, then A◦ is the formula of
LI that is the result of replacing all occurrences of t : in A with ✷. We
immediately get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.74 (Forgetful projection). Let CS be an arbitrary constant
specification. For each LJ-formula A,
⊢iJT4CS A implies ⊢IS4 A
◦.
Proof. By induction on the length of the iJT4CS derivation.
It is easy to see that for each axiom A of iJT4CS, we have ⊢IS4 A◦.
IfA is the conclusion of an application of modus ponens from premisesB
and B → A, then by induction hypothesis and the deﬁnition of ·◦ we get
⊢IS4 B
◦ and ⊢IS4 B◦ → A◦
and thus ⊢IS4 A◦ by modus ponens.
If A is the conclusion of an instance of axiom necessitation, then A
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has the form c : B for some axiom B of iJT4CS. Therefore, as shown
above, ⊢IS4 B◦. An application of necessitation yields ⊢IS4 ✷B◦, which is
⊢IS4 A
◦.
Now we show the converse direction, namely that iJT4 realizes IS4.
For this, we need the following deﬁnition: a realization r is a mapping
from LI to LJ such that for each LI-formula A we have that
(r(A))◦ = A.
A realization is normal if all negative occurrences of ✷ are realized by
justiﬁcation variables.
Theorem 3.75 (Realization). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate and
schematic constant specification. Then there exists a realization r such that
for each LI-formula A we have
⊢GIS4 A implies ⊢iJT4CS r(A).
Proof. It turns out that Artemov’s original realization proof for LP [Art01]
also works in the intuitionistic case. We will only give a proof sketch here.
We start with deﬁning positive and negative occurrences of ✷ in a se-
quent as usual. Observe that the rules of GIS4 respect these polarities so
that (⊃ ✷) introduces positive occurrences of ✷ and (✷ ⊃) introduces neg-
ative occurrences of ✷. Occurrences of ✷ are related if they occur in related
formulas of premises and conclusions of rules; we close this relationship of
related occurrences under transitivity. All occurrences of ✷ in a GIS4-
derivation naturally split into disjoint families of related occurrences. We
call a family essential if at least one of its members is introduced by a
(⊃ ✷) rule. Note that an essential family is positive (i.e. contains only
positive occurrences).
Now let D be the GIS4 derivation that proves A. The desired LJ-
formula r(A) is constructed by the following three steps. We reserve a
large enough set of justiﬁcation variables as provisional variables.
(a) For each negative family and each non-essential positive family, re-
place all ✷ occurrences by x : where we choose a fresh justiﬁcation
variable for each family.
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(b) Pick an essential family f . Enumerate all occurrences of (⊃ ✷) rules
that introduce a ✷-operator to this family. Replace each ✷ with a
justiﬁcation term
v1 + · · ·+ vnf
where each vi is a fresh provisional variable. Do this for each essential
family. The resulting tree D′ is labelled by LJ-formulas.
(c) Replace the provisional variables starting with the leaves and working
toward the root. By induction on the depth of a node in D we
establish that after the process passes a node, the sequent assigned
to this node becomes derivable in iJT4CS where derivability of Γ ⊃ A
means Γ ⊢iJT4CS A. We distinguish the following cases.
a) The axioms Γ ⊃ A with A ∈ Γ or ⊥ ∈ Γ are derivable in iJT4CS.
b) For every rule other than (⊃ ✷) we do not change the term as-
signment and establish that the conclusion of the rule is deriv-
able in iJT4CS if the premises are.
c) Let an occurrence of a (⊃ ✷) rule have number i in the enumer-
ation of all (⊃ ✷) rules in a given family f . The corresponding
node in D′ is labelled by
y1 : B1, . . . , yk : Bk ⊃ A
y1 : B1, . . . , yk : Bk ⊃ u1 + · · ·+ unf : A
where the y’s are justiﬁcation variables, the u’s are justiﬁca-
tion terms, and ui is a provisional variable. By the induction
hypothesis
y1 : B1, . . . , yk : Bk ⊃ A
is derivable in iJT4CS. Using the Lifting Lemma, we construct
a term t such that
y1 : B1, . . . , yk : Bk ⊢iJT4CS t : A.
Thus
y1 : B1, . . . , yk : Bk ⊢iJT4CS u1+· · ·+ui−1+t+ui+1+· · ·+unf : A.
Substitute t for ui everywhere in D′. By Lemma 3.44, this does
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not aﬀect the already established derivability results.
Eventually, all provisional variables are replaced with terms of non-
provisional variables in D′ and we have established that its root se-
quent r(A) is derivable in iJT4CS. The realization r built by this
construction is normal.
3.10. Conclusion
We have established that if we take the classical Logic of Proofs and change
the underlying classical propositional logic to intuitionistic propositional
logic, then we obtain an explicit counterpart of the intuitionistic modal
logic IS4. This is an interesting result since the logic of proofs of Heyting
arithmetic includes additional axioms that introduce special justiﬁcation
terms for all admissible rules of intuitionistic logic. This seems necessary
to obtain completeness with respect to provability semantics where the
justiﬁcation relation is interpreted by formal provability in Heyting Arith-
metic.
Our results now show that these additional axioms and justiﬁcation
terms are not needed if we are interested in the explicit counterpart of
intuitionistic modal logic and the corresponding possible world semantics
for justiﬁcation logic.
Moreover, we believe that intuitionistic justiﬁcation logics will help
to understand intuitionistic modal logics better. In particular, they will
help to clarify the role of additional principles for the ✷-modality and the
corresponding conditions on the accessibility relation. However, this is left
for future research.
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